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ABSTRACT 
The abrupt legislative destruction of the Court of Star Chamber in the summer of 
1641 is generally understood as a reaction against the perceived abuses of prerogative 
government during the decade of Charles I’s personal rule. The conception of the court as 
an ‘extra-legal’ tribunal (or as a legitimate court that had exceeded its jurisdictional 
mandate) emerges from the constitutional debate about the limits of executive authority 
that played out over in Parliament, in the press, in the pulpit, in the courts, and on the 
battlefields of seventeenth-century England. Too narrow a focus on the question of the 
court’s legitimacy, however, impedes our ability to understand the historical Court of Star 
Chamber and the significant role it played in policing the boundaries of public expression 
in prerevolutionary England. This thesis attempts to capture an image of the Court of Star 
Chamber as it existed during the late 1620s and early 1630s by identifying the individuals 
who formed the ‘core’ of the court and by examining the court’s decisions in a series of 
representative cases. This study exposes the fault lines of political allegiance, religious 
persuasion, and judicial temperament that divided the members of the court. On the other 
hand, it suggests that the men who sat as judges in the Court of Star Chamber shared a 
commitment to the preservation of the established order in church and state—a 
commitment fundamentally out of place in a society that was entering a period of radical 
change. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 INTRODUCTION: 
 
A QUESTION OF ORIGINS AND A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 
 
 
. . . by this uncertainty of Jurisdiction amongst Courts, causes 
are scourged from Court to Court . . . Therefore the only way 
to avoid this, is for you to keep to your owne bounds . . . .” 
 
— James I, Address in Starre-Chamber, 1616.1 
 
 
It is the most honourable court, (our parliament excepted) that 
is in the Christian world, both in respect of the judges of the 
court and of their honourable proceeding according to their 
just jurisdiction . . . . 
 
— Sir Edward Coke2 
 
On March 5, 1641, the newly-created Lord Andover rose to deliver a “brisk 
speech” in favor of his motion to abolish the Court of Star-Chamber. He argued that the 
court owed its origins to a statute 
framed, 3 Hen. 7. authorizing the Chancellor, Treasurer, and Privy-Seal, 
and the two Chief Justices, calling to them one Bishop and a Temporal 
Lord of the King's Council, to receive Complaints upon Bill or 
Information, and cite such Parties to appear, as stand accused of any 
Misdemeanor; and this was the Infancy of the Star-Chamber: But 
afterwards the Star-Chamber was, by Cardinal Wolsey, 8 Hen, 8. raised to 
Man's Estate.3 
                                                          
1 James I, King of England. His Magesties Speech in the Starre-Chamber, the XX of Iune. 
(London: Robert Barker, 1616), 17. 
2 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England IV (London: M. Flesher, 1644), 65. These 
words were probably written long before Coke’s death in 1634. 
3 Rushworth, "Historical Collections: March 1641," in Historical Collections of Private 
Passages of State: Volume 4, 1640-42, (London: D Browne, 1721), 202-213. British History 
Online (hereinafter ‘BHO’), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol4/pp202-213. 
Oddly, no mention of this monumental event appears in the House of Lords Journal for March 5, 
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From these beginnings, Andover suggested, the Court had grown “now altogether 
unlimited,” into “a Monster and will hourly produce worse Effects, unless it be reduced 
by that Hand which laid the Foundation.” For Andover, the Court of Star Chamber had 
become a black hole, swallowing not only the jurisdiction of the common law courts, but 
the authority of Parliament itself.4 King Charles I and his Archbishop of Canterbury, 
William Laud, were attempting to rule England through the Star Chamber just as Louis 
XIII and Cardinal Richelieu had done in France since 1614, casting off the Estates 
General and ruling instead through the parlements. More generally, Andover worried 
about the eclipse of the nobility. Legislation from the reign of Edward III required the 
holding of a Parliament at least once a year,5 he reminded the peers, and “yet who durst a 
year ago mention such a Statute, without incurring the Danger of Mr. Kilvert 's 
Persecution?”6 Andover urged the “whole Body of Parliament” to “join in one 
Supplication,” expressing confidence that “his Majesty will desire that nothing shall 
                                                          
1641—or, indeed, for any other day. “5 March 1641,” in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 
4, 1629-42, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), 176-177. BHO, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol4/pp176-177. 
4 See note 19 below, and accompanying text. 
5 4 Edw. 3. (1330). 
6  Richard Kilvert was a lawyer who practiced before the courts of Star Chamber and High 
Commission. He was close to Windebank, Lambe, Laud, and others of Charles’s inner circle. 
Here Andover may have been alluding to Kilvert’s history of using Star Chamber prosecutions 
for extortion, as he did with the Vintners’ Company in 1637, or to his role in toppling bishop 
John Williams. See “Kilvert, Richard (c. 1588-1650)” in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1885–2004), http://www.oxfordDNB.com 
(hereinafter, ‘DNB’). 
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remain in force, which his People do not willingly obey.”7 
 Four months later, on July 1, 1641, members of both Houses of Parliament met to 
confer about the status of two bills, “one for taking away the Court of High Commission; 
and the other, to take away the Court of Star Chamber” and to “regulate” the Privy 
Council.8 The Lords apparently needed no persuasion to dismantle the Court of High-
Commission, but some suggested that the Court of Star Chamber could be salvaged by 
reducing its jurisdiction “to what Power it had in Henry VII's Time.” The court no longer 
enjoyed the confidence of Parliament, however, and on July 5, 1641, Charles gave his 
reluctant assent to the legislation: “Le Roy le veult.”9 With these words, Charles not only 
assented to the destruction of the most visible pillars of royal prerogative government, but 
also ratified Parliament’s assertion that Star Chamber and High Commission had 
overstepped their lawful boundaries. The judges “in the Court commonly called the Star 
Chamber,” the statute declared,    
have not kept themselves to the points limited by the said Statute but have 
undertaken to punish where no Law doth warrant and to make Decrees for 
things having no such authoritie and to inflict heavier punishments then by 
any Law is warranted.   
 
The decrees that flowed from the bench at Star Chamber had “by experience beene found 
to be an intollerable burthen to the subjects and the meanes to introduce an Arbitrary 
Power and Government.”  A ringing indictment—but was it true? 
                                                          
7 Rushworth, "Historical Collections: July 1641 (1 of 2)," 304-333. BHO, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol4/pp304-333. 
8 Rushworth, "Historical Collections: July 1641 (1 of 2)," 304-333.  
9 “5 July 1641,” in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 4, 1629-42 (London, 1767-1830), 
pp. 299-301. BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol4/pp299-301 
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 The Act of July 5, 1641, abolishing the Court of Star Chamber, codified the 
proposition that the court owed its entire existence to a prior act of Parliament in the third 
year of Henry VII’s reign (1487). This argument appealed to court’s opponents for two 
reasons: first, it established Parliament’s authority to dismantle the court—what 
Parliament had created, Parliament could destroy; and second, it served to delegitimize 
much of the court’s recent work. It was less a legal argument, however, than a political 
tactic designed to exploit the ambiguities and uncertainties in existing law.    
  
The Act of 1487 which forms the basis of the Long Parliament’s legislation 
consigning the Court of Star Chamber to oblivion remains something of an enigma. On 
one hand, it confers jurisdiction upon a group of seven clearly-delineated officials to hear 
and decide a discrete but open-ended number of misdemeanors. The seven officials 
named in the statute were the Chancellor, the Lord Treasurer, the Lord Privy Seal, the 
two chief justices, a bishop, and a ‘temporal lord’. (Subsequent legislation clarified that 
the position of Lord Keeper of the Great Seal was interchangeable with that of 
Chancellor.) On the other hand, Sir Edward Coke, William Hudson, and other 
contemporary commentators with firsthand experience of the court’s operations insisted 
that the court’s ‘institutional memory’—its practices and precedents—stretched back to a 
time more distant than the reign of Henry VII. These competing visions of the court’s 
origins and purpose have never been satisfactorily reconciled.  
One possibility is that the 1487 act created a totally distinct court to deal with a 
discreet problem “for the time being.” In other words, the statutory court might have 
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come and gone with the conditions that brought it into existence. Some commentators 
perhaps inadvertently default to this view by simply dismissing the 1487 statute as having 
nothing to do with the Court of Star Chamber, but ignoring the problem does not solve it. 
There is a remarkable similarity between the statutory (1487) court’s personnel and 
procedures and the actual composition and practice of the Court of Star Chamber, and for 
that reason alone, it seems reasonable to deduce a connection.  
Whatever may be the ‘truth’ concerning whether the origins of Star Chamber are 
legislative or organic (or both), what we are interested in here is simply an understanding 
of contemporary perceptions of the seventeenth century court. When Cora Scofield 
studied the Court of Star Chamber in 1900, she identified a savings clause in an 
Elizabethan statute10 that provides conclusive evidence that by the 1560s legislators 
believed that the Act of Henry VII had created (or definitively enhanced in some way) 
the powers of the Court of Star Chamber. The statute provides:  
this act, or any therein contained, shall not extend in any wise to restrain 
the power and authority given by act of Parliament made in the time of 
King Henry the Seventh, to the Lord Chancellor of England and others of 
the King’s Council, for the time being, to examine and punish riots, routs, 
heinous perjuries and other offences and misdemeanings: which Lord 
Chancellor and others sithence the making of the said act have most 
commonly used to hear and determine such matters in the Court of 
Westminster commonly called the Star Chamber.11    
 
Other evidence of the relationship between 1487 statute and the Court of Star Chamber is 
                                                          
10 5 Elizabeth c. 9 (1562-63). 
11 Cora Scofield, A Study of the Court of Star Chamber (New York: Burt Franklin, 1900), 10. 
This language would also offer some support for the jurisdictional argument embedded within the 
text of the 1641 statute abolishing Star Chamber, were it not for the phrase “and other offences 
and misdemeanings,” which completely explodes the notion that the statutory language was 
intended to be restrictive rather than illustrative.    
 6 
the title “Pro Camera Stellata,” which was added to the Rolls sometime after the statute 
was originally engrossed.12 This could have been a clerical misunderstanding, but given 
the other similarities between the court described on paper and the historical Star 
Chamber, the handwritten caption does not seem to be a mistake.  
However, some historians have been unwilling to treat the 1487 act as having any 
bearing on the Court of Star Chamber. In 1922, for example, A. F. Pollard wrote that “so 
far as I can see, the act of 1487 had little or nothing to do with the star chamber.” After 
comparing the known composition and personnel of the Court of Star Chamber under the 
later Tudors with the composition of the court created in the 1487 statute, Pollard 
concluded that the statute’s provisions were “inconsistent with what we know of the 
personnel, the practice, and the procedure” of the Court of Star Chamber.”13 Cora 
Scofield also emphasized the discrepancy between the seven members of the court 
identified in the 1487 statute (the Chancellor, Treasurer, Lord Privy-Seal, the two Chief 
Justices, one Bishop, and a Temporal Lord of the King's Council) and the list of men who 
actually sat as judges in Star Chamber which, according to some early commentators, 
might lawfully include any of the barons who happened to be in London and chose to 
attend.”14  
Pollard’s view recycles what contemporary legal commentators seemed to 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., J.R. Tanner, ed., Tudor Constitutional Documents A.D. 1485-1603: With an 
Historical Commentary. Cambridge University Press, 1940 [1930].  
13 A. F. Pollard, “Council Star Chamber, and Privy Council under the Tudors, II. The Star 
Chamber,” The English Historical Review 37, no. 148 (1922): 520.  
14 See Scofield, Court of Star Chamber, 11-13. 
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believe. The most important of these was William Hudson, a Star Court practitioner and 
clerk during the court’s final decades. In his treatise, which focuses mainly on the court’s 
procedure, Hudson offered to prove 
by judicial acts and records this court is most antient as it is now 
established, I mean in the same manner, place, and all circumstances, and 
not founded by act of parliament in the reign of king H. 7.; a doating 
which no man that had looked upon the records of the court would have 
lighted upon . . .15 
 
Hudson pointed to a ruling by “the chief judges of England,” in a case between the Earl 
of Northumberland and Sir Stephen Proctor, to the effect that the statute 3 Henry VII 
“extended not any way to this court.” Hudson suggested that the act from Henry VII’s 
time merely conferred upon (or recognized) the authority of the Chancellor and other 
councilors named to “determine of the matters therein specified” “at all times, in all 
places.”16 This explanation of the statutory court’s function is somewhat less than 
helpful.  
 Hudson believed he had found an example of Star Chamber sitting during the 
reign of Edward III: “And 4c. E. 3. the king received the complaint of Elizabeth, wife of 
Nicholas Studley, and thereupon caused James Studley to appear before his chancellor, 
treasurer, justices, and other sages, assembled in la chambre de estioles pris de la receipt 
at Westminster, being the place where the court is now kept.”17 If Hudson is right, this 
                                                          
15 Hudson, Treatise on the Court of Star Chamber, [1633?]. In Francis Hargrave, ed. 
Collectanea Juridica: Consisting of Tracts Relative to the Law and Constitution of England, vol. 
2 (London: E. & R. Brooke, 1792), 10. (Hudson acted as king’s attorney during William Prynne’s 
1634 Star Chamber trial for the book Histriomastix.) 
16 Hudson, 10-11. 
17 Hudson, 12-13. 
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Studley family quarrel captures the Star Chamber in action early in the fourteenth 
century. But accepting that the Court of Star Chamber related back to a ‘greater antiquity’ 
than the Act of 1487, we are still in the position of having to explain what the 1487 was 
statute intended to accomplish.  
In 1629, when Richard Chambers challenged the authority of the Star Chamber to 
fine him for his refusal to pay illegal customs duties on the basis of the 1487 act, the 
judges responded with more of a declaration than an answer: “all the Court informed him 
that the Court of Star Chamber was not erected by the statute of 3 Hen. VII, but was a 
court many years before.”18 The silence is perplexing, but Rushworth may have stumbled 
across the reason for it when he went in search of contemporary commentaries on the 
jurisdictional problem, probably during the late 1630s:  
Only Sir Thomas Smith, in his Common-wealth hath glanced upon it, and 
Mr. Lambert, the ancient Antiquary, treateth of the Power and Jurisdiction 
of it; and the reason probably why the Learned of the Laws did, in their 
Reports, forbear to make mention thereof was, because it intrenched in 
those days, as of late time, too much upon the Common Law of England; 
and the abuse in the exercise of the Jurisdiction of the Court, might induce 
the Sages of the Law to pass it over in silence, as an Usurpation of 
Monarchy upon the Common Law of England, in the prejudice of the 
liberty of the Subject, granted by the Great Charter.”19 
 
In any event, the best explanation of the Act of 1487 that I have found is that it 
conferred new or different authority on a pre-existing court. Some variation of this view 
gained a consensus among twentieth-century historians. J. R. Tanner, for example, 
                                                          
18 Rushworth, "Historical Collections: 1629," 662-691. BHO, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol1/pp662-691. 
19 Rushworth, "Historical Collections: 1637 (3 of 5)," 461-481. BHO, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol2/pp461-481. 
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concluded that “the effect of the Act of 1487 can perhaps be best described by saying that 
it established what would now be called a ‘statutory committee’ of the [King’s] Council, 
empowered to act on behalf of the whole Council in respect of certain offences.”20   
Whatever the influence of the Act of 1487 on the Star Chamber’s composition or 
jurisdiction, there is no doubt that the Court of Star Chamber throughout its existence was 
essentially a ‘hat’ worn—or a room visited—by members of the king’s inner council (the 
body of advisors that during the reign of Henry VIII came to be called the Privy Council). 
Edward Cheyney characterized the Court of Star Chamber as  
simply a special Wednesday and Friday session of the Privy Council. The 
difference between the ordinary meetings of the Privy Council and the 
Court of Star Chamber was not a difference of men, but a difference of 
time and place of sitting, of procedure, and above all of functions.”21  
 
Two days per week, four terms per year, the king’s Chancellor and other chief ministers 
sat together as judges to hear cases involving riot, scandal, perjury, and abuse of process, 
just to name a few common categories. And although the Court of Star Chamber grew out 
of what was first and foremost a policymaking body, most commentators describe it as a 
‘real’ court (although there is some question about whether Star Chamber constituted a 
‘court of record’). Cheyney insisted that “Star Chamber was a court of justice with a 
settled body of legal precedents and practices.”22 In this we can agree with Hudson that 
throughout its existence the Star Chamber  functioned “as an established court of settled 
                                                          
20 Tanner, ed., Tudor Constitutional Documents, 250. 
21 Edward P. Cheyney, “The Court of Star Chamber.” The American Historical Review 18, no. 
4 (Jul., 1913): 728. Coke gives the same schedule. Institutes of the Laws of England, vol. IV, 66.  
22 Cheyney, “The Court of Star Chamber.” The American Historical Review 18, no. 4 (Jul., 
1913), 729. 
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justice.”23  
 
The abrupt legislative destruction of the Court of Star Chamber in the summer of 
1641 is generally understood as a reaction against the perceived abuses of prerogative 
government during the decade of Charles I’s personal rule. The conception of Star 
Chamber as an ‘extra-legal’ tribunal (or, alternatively, as a legitimate court that had 
exceeded its jurisdictional mandate) emerged from the constitutional debate about the 
limits of executive authority that played out over the course of the seventeenth century in 
Parliament, in the press, in the pulpit, in the courts, and on the battlefield. Too narrow a 
focus on the question of the court’s legitimacy, however, impedes our ability to 
understand the historical Court of Star Chamber and the significant role it played in 
policing the boundaries of public expression in prerevolutionary England. In this thesis I 
want to step back from questions about the court’s legitimacy in order to understand the 
Court of Star Chamber as a human institution. 
 In order to accomplish this task, Chapter Two begins with an attempt to identify 
the individuals who formed the ‘core’ of the Court of Star Chamber during the early 
1630s—that is, those who sat as judges with greatest frequency. I then briefly consider 
the biographies of the principal members of this ‘core’ group of judges, especially 
Thomas Coventry, who served as Lord Keeper of the Great Seal throughout the entire 
period (1625-1640), and Lord Manchester, who became Lord Privy Seal in 1628, serving 
                                                          
23 Hudson, Treatise on the Court of Star Chamber, 16. Hudson notes that later in the reign of 
Henry VII, the President of the King’s Council, rather than the Lord Chancellor, presided over 
proceedings in the Star Chamber. Therefore, because the President of the Council isn’t mentioned 
in 3. Hen. 7., Hudson concludes that the court “sat not by virtue of that statute.”  
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until his death in 1642.24 After introducing the most active judges, Chapter Two takes the 
reader into the Court of Star Chamber to listen to the sentencing speeches delivered in 
three representative cases in order to expose the fault lines of political allegiance, 
religious persuasion, and judicial temperament that divided the court. The case of Richard 
Chambers reveals the spectrum of political opinion among the judges, the case of Henry 
Sherfield exposes the judges’ divergent religious views, and Lord Falkland’s case offers a 
glimpse into the real differences in temperament and judicial philosophy which informed 
the judges’ decisions. Falkland’s case also demonstrates, however, that the judges of Star 
Chamber broadly shared the common goal of protecting the established social order.        
 In Chapters Three and Four I survey a sample of speech cases that came to 
hearing in the Star Chamber in the late 1620s and early 1630s in an attempt to evoke a 
sense of the ‘message’ the court was trying to communicate through its decisions. Whole 
books, chapters, and articles have been devoted to the sensational political trials the court 
conducted later in the decade—especially to the cases involving the lawyer and 
controversial Puritan author William Prynne, who, after all, lost both ears twice.25 But by 
focusing on a discreet sample of cases from the early years of king Charles’ reign, I hope 
                                                          
24 William Laud, who served on the Court of Star Chamber first as Bishop of London and then, 
after 1633, as Archbishop of Canterbury, arguably deserves a separate chapter given his close 
association with the court’s reputation for harsh, vindictive punishments, but for the sake of space 
I have chosen to focus most of my attention on the less well-known judges. 
25 The judges of Star Chamber seem to have felt a profound dislike for William Prynne. During 
Prynne’s 1634 sedition trial for his book Histriomastix, the ordinarily sanguine Secretary of State 
John Coke (also spelled Cook) quipped, “He calleth his Book Histrio-mastix; but therein he 
sheweth himself like unto Ajax, ‘Anthropomastix’, as the Grecians called him, the Scourge of all 
mankind, that is, the whipper and the whip.” Thomas Bayly Howell, ed., Cobbett’s Complete 
Collection of State Trials, vol. 3, 1627-1640 (London: T. C. Hansard, 1809), 582. 
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to minimize the potential for distortion caused by paying too much attention to the 
period’s political trials (though several such trials are considered) and to offer a more 
complete picture of the court’s role in regulating public expression in prerevolutionary 
England.   
 The Conclusion will suggest that the Court of Star Chamber was defined as an 
institution by its commitment to the maintenance of the status quo in church and state. By 
1640 a revolution was underway, in which William Laud’s vision of Anglicanism and 
Charles I’s vision of royal prerogative were under assault. As a prominent weapon for the 
suppression of political opposition and seditious opinion, the Court of Star Chamber was 
out of step with the changing attitudes toward authority that characterized the new 
environment. Although Charles I would retain possession of his crown—and the head 
upon which it sat—for another seven-and-a-half years, the abolition of Star Chamber 
was, perhaps, the political equivalent of lopping off the king’s ears, branding his 
cheeks—perhaps with a ‘T’ for ‘tyrant—and setting him in the pillory.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE JUDGES OF STAR CHAMBER 
  
 
Ye see yon birkie, ca'd a lord,  
Wha struts, an' stares, an' a' that;  
Tho' hundreds worship at his word,  
He's but a coof for a' that:   
For a' that, an' a' that,  
His ribband, star, an' a' that:  
The man o' independent mind  
He looks an' laughs at a' that. 
 
- Robert Burns (1795) 
 
 
Up to this point, we have been speaking of the Court of Star Chamber as if it were 
a thing—a quiddity. Given the close identification of the name of the court with the 
ornate room in which it sat to deliberate, this way of thinking is perhaps especially 
unavoidable. But reification is a temptation when describing any human institution. 
British usage is somewhat less culpable in this regard, but most English speakers resort to 
monolithic nouns and singular pronouns to describe coordinated human activities: 
individual actors are swallowed up in the unitary concept evoked by words like ‘team’, 
‘jury’, or ‘government’.26 The very word ‘institution’ has the cold, inhuman ring of a 
concrete wall about it. The point of this chapter, however, is to suggest that although the 
Court of Star Chamber could, and often did, speak with one voice as it poured out the 
                                                          
26 There are exceptions, of course. For example, we say ‘the police are on their way’, not ‘the 
police is on its way’—perhaps an ironic etymological development given the number of 
officers who typically respond to a call is typically fewer than two. But this usage reflects the 
understanding that policing is fundamentally a collaborative effort.    
 14 
collective fury of offended power upon the real or perceived enemies of the established 
order, the ‘court’ at its essence was a collection of individual men—wealthy men, 
influential men, well-connected men—but men for all that.   
As Cora Scofield and others have observed, the number of judges actually in 
attendance on any given Star Chamber day varied widely, from as few as four to as many 
as twenty-two.27 From the sample of thirty cases transcribed by Samuel Gardiner for the 
Selden Society, it appears that during the early 1630s the average number of judges in 
attendance was nine. However, the large number of lords who showed up to decide the 
‘high-profile’ cases may skew the average somewhat, because the median and mode in 
Gardiner’s sample are both seven.28 Hudson suggests that during the reigns of Henry VII 
and Henry VIII, as many as “seven or eight bishops and prelates” might be in attendance 
on any given day.29 Hudson thought this was a good thing, opining that the presence of 
fewer churchmen on the Court in his own day had led to an increase in the size of the 
fines levied as punishment. In earlier times, he believed, “the fines trenched not to the 
destruction of the offender's estate and utter ruin of him and his posterity, as now they do, 
but to his correction and amendment, the Clergy's song being of mercy.”30 Hudson, it 
seems, was not well acquainted with William Laud or Richard Neile! 
                                                          
27  Scofield placed the upper limit at eighteen, but Mark Kishlansky counted twenty-two judges 
at William Prynne’s 1634 sedition trial. Mark Kishlansky, “A Whipper Whipped: The Sedition of 
William Prynne.” The Historical Journal 56, no. 3 (2013), 610.   
28 Samuel Gardiner, ed., Reports of Cases in the Courts of Star Chamber and High 
Commission, (Camden Society, 1886).  
29 Hudson, Treatise on the Court of Star Chamber, 36.  
30 Hudson, 36. 
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Hudson was writing at the end of his career, and in several passing comments he 
suggests that the Court of Star Chamber had suffered a decline under Charles I. He 
lamented the “multiplying of officers,” fearing that the bureaucratic expansion would “in 
short time, be complained of as a great grievance for increase of fees . . . .”31 And he 
voiced a regret that every Star Chamber historian must feel when he added, “in the 
meantime the records are negligently kept, and many times lost.”32 Hudson clearly held 
the Court of Star Chamber in high regard, but even he worried that  
latter times have rather introduced favourites or kinsmen as subjects for 
the judge's favour ; an error surely in great men, and a scandal to so high a 
seat of honour, where the suspicion of any inclination to partiality should 
be avoided as a dishonour to the majesty thereof, and any Countenance to 
unworthiness as a badge of infirmity.33 
 
It is not entirely clear what conflicts of interest Hudson had in mind, but family or 
financial relationships might help to explain some of the disparities in sentencing we will 
encounter in Chapter Four.  
  
In beginning to distill the views of the judges who composed the Court of Star 
Chamber during the early years of Charles I’s reign, it will be helpful to de-emphasize the 
period’s most sensational political trials. The cases of Alexander Leighton and William 
Prynne in the early 1630s, and of Henry Burton, John Bastwick, Prynne (again) and John 
                                                          
31 The Court does seem to have developed a reputation for fee gouging in its closing decades. 
See, e.g., Anon., The Star-Chamber Epitomized, or A Dialogue between Inquisition, a News-
Smeller, and Christopher Cob-Web, a Keeper of the Records, for the Star-Chamber, as They Met 
at the Office in Grayes-Inne. (London, 1641). 
32 Hudson, Treatise on the Court of Star Chamber, 41.  
33 Hudson, 26.  
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Lilburne during the second half of the decade, will always remain central to the court’s 
legacy, and they do not become less important simply because they are well-known. 
These cases represent the power of the state to exact exemplary retribution from those 
who chose not to play by the rules. Yet it is only when we examine a range of 
representative cases that the personalities of the individual judges begin to shine through, 
and on very rare occasions we even discern the ideological fissures that divided the 
judges—differences in political and religious points of view that were largely masked by 
the pressure to reach an ‘approved’ outcome in closely-watched cases. Even if certain 
members of the court felt sympathy for incendiaries like Prynne or Leighton, it would 
have been dangerous—or at least politically treacherous—to be caught seeming to side 
with them.34 No one who sat as a judge in Star Chamber in the early 1630s would have 
been unaware of the fate of Sir Randolph Crewe, who was dismissed from his post as 
Chief Justice of King’s Bench in 1626 for his role in notifying Charles of the common 
law judges’ refusal to rubber stamp his attempt to circumvent Parliament via the forced 
loan.       
The remainder of this chapter is an attempt to ‘deinstitutionalize’ the men who 
made up the Court of Star Chamber in hopes that thinking about them as individuals will 
help us reconstruct the collective ‘mind’ of the court. To accomplish this, I will briefly 
summarize the biographies of the four judges who, through regular attendance, can be 
said to have formed the ‘core of the court during the early years of Charles I’s reign. I 
                                                          
34 We can be sure that such pressures were at work, as evidenced by Prynne’s inability to find a 
lawyer willing to sign his answer. Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 761.  
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then step back to consider the court’s decision-making process in several representative 
cases in which the judges’ individual comments have been preserved in the record. At the 
close of each hearing, the judges publicly framed their ruling from the bench. The 
spontaneity of these deliberations is impossible to miss, although the order in which the 
lords presented their recommendations followed a standardized pattern. According to 
Barnes, “the court spoke in ascending order of precedence, from mere Privy Councillors 
through lesser officers of state, judges of the Common Law, peers, and finally great 
officers, the Lord Chancellor speaking last.”35 It is in these public deliberations that we 
have a chance to reconstruct the ‘thought process’ of the Court of Star Chamber. Before 
eavesdropping on the judges, however, it will help to know something about who they 
were.  
As already mentioned, only fragmentary records of the Star Chamber’s 
proceedings survive for the period of Charles I’s reign, and it is not always possible to 
know which judges were present at the hearing of any particular case. Even so, it is 
possible to develop a sense of which individuals attended most regularly and thereby gain 
at least a hazy picture of the ‘core’ of the court. To my knowledge, no systematic study of 
this sort has yet been conducted, but I will attempt to suggest the outlines of what such a 
study might look like using as a sample thirty cases transcribed by Gardiner for the 
Selden society, all of which came to hearing in Star Chamber during the six terms of 
court beginning with Easter, 1631. During this period, at least thirty individuals sat as 
                                                          
35 Thomas G. Barnes, “Due Process and Slow Process in the Late Elizabethan-Early Stuart Star 
Chamber: Part II,” American Journal of Legal History 6, no. 4 (October, 1962): 229.  
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judges in the Star Chamber, although never, apparently, more than about twenty at the 
same time. Many individuals seem to have presided only rarely—once or twice in our 
sample—while others were present at nearly every hearing. The disparity in attendance 
records is probably attributable to geography and the pull of other commitments. John 
Egerton, Earl of Bridgewater, for example, was present at only five of the hearings in our 
sample; but this is actually impressive considering that 1631 was also the year in which 
he took on the role of President of the Council of Wales. And while I do not have direct 
evidence of this, I suspect that certain judges were brought in to ‘stack’ the court in 
important cases. 
The judges with the highest attendance records in our sample are:  
Name        Cases Decided 
Henry Montagu, Earl of Manchester, Lord Privy Seal  19 
Thomas, Baron Coventry, Lord Keeper    18 
Sir Thomas Richardson, Chief Justice of Common Pleas  17 
    (Chief Justice of King’s Bench from October 24, 1631)     
Sir Robert Heath, Chief Justice of Common Pleas   12 
    (former attorney general; replaced Richardson)  
William Laud, Bishop of London     11 
Henry Danvers, Earl of Danby       8 
Sir Thomas Jarmin           7 
Sir John Coke, principal Secretary of State        7 
Edward Sackville, Earl of Dorset         7 
Henry Cary, Viscount Falkland         6 
   (former Lord Deputy of Ireland)  
 Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel, Surry, and Norfolk      6  
 
The average age of this group of regular attendees was about 56. At 68, Sir John 
Coke, one of Charles’ two principal secretaries of state, was the oldest, closely followed 
by Montagu, Lord Privy seal, at 67. Other than Justice Richardson, at 62, and Danby, 
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who at 40 was something of an outlier, all the others were in their mid-50s.36 There is not 
space here to include comparative biographical sketches of all the judges in this subset of 
‘core members’, so we will focus on the four names at the top of the list in hopes that 
their backgrounds will serve as an adequate gestalt for the court as a whole.  
 Manchester had the best attendance record in our sample, and we will come to 
him next, but as lord keeper from 1625-1640, Thomas Coventry is the individual most 
closely identified with the institution of Star Chamber under Charles I. Coventry was 
born in 1578 to a Worcestershire family. His father was a judge, and Coventry followed 
him first to Balliol College, Oxford, and then into the legal profession (he was called to 
the bar in 1603). His first wife, Sarah Sebright, was the paternal niece of the town clerk 
of London, and probably through this family connection Coventry became “counsel to 
the Skinners' Company” and obtained “the reversion of the town clerkship and the 
judgeship of the sheriff's court.” Sarah died not long after she and Coventry were 
married, possibly in giving birth to their son, Thomas. Coventry remarried in 1610, this 
time choosing “the widow of a wealthy London grocer.” As with Coventry’s previous 
marriage, it seems that this new relationship also led to career advancement, this time an 
appointment as counsel to the Grocers' Company.37 
                                                          
36 I have not been able to find an age—or indeed any reliable biographical information for 
Thomas Jarmin, although this may be the same individual as the Thomas Jarman who died in 
Wales in 1648. https://www.ancestry.com/genealogy/records/thomas-jarman_41459440  
37 Coventry, Thomas, first Baron Coventry (1578–1640), in DNB. 
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During the late 1610s and early 1620s, Coventry climbed the ranks in the Inner 
Temple, where he was mentored by Sir Edward Coke.38 The relationship must have 
endured, because Coventry acted as executor of Coke's estate (along with Sir Randolph 
Crewe) after Coke died in September of 1634. In 1616, when Sir Henry Montagu was 
appointed to replace Coke as Chief Justice of King’s Bench, Coventry took his place as 
Recorder of London. Coventry continued his ascent to the upper echelons of the legal 
profession, becoming solicitor-general in 1617, attorney-general in 1621, and finally, in 
1625, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England. (His predecessor in this last post was the 
Puritan sympathizer, Bishop of York John Williams, who would become a Star Chamber 
defendant in 1637.) 
 Coventry seems to have been something of a ‘yes-man’ for Charles and the Duke 
of Buckingham, playing a prominent role in defending Buckingham in Parliament in 
1626 and delivering the king’s ultimatum. In 1628, during the debate that led to the 
Petition of Right, he defended the position that habeas corpus was not available to 
individuals detained at the king’s direction.39 On the other hand, while Coventry was 
willing to do what he had to do to stay in the king’s good graces, he does not seem to 
have been an ideologue. This feature of his character is manifest in his friendships with 
Puritans such as John Preston, and in his unwillingness to take a hard line with Sherfield 
(as we will see below). If Coventry’s had Puritan leanings, however, they are not 
                                                          
38 “Sir Francis Bacon later described Coventry as ‘bred by Lord Coke and seasoned in his 
ways’.” Coventry, Thomas, first Baron Coventry (1578–1640), in DNB. 
39 Coventry, Thomas, first Baron Coventry (1578–1640), in DNB.  
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reflected in his conduct during the joint trial of Bastwick, Burton, and Prynne, in 1637. 
Instead he can be seen treating the defendants with a curt impatience. For example, at one 
point in the trial Dr. Bastwick appealed directly to the Earl of Arundel, imploring him to 
recognize the “base cowardice” of the prelates in taking away the defendants’ weapons 
before inviting them to single combat, concluding, “I know, my lord, there is a decree 
gone forth (for my Sentence was passed long since) to cut off our ears. L. Keeper.” 
Perhaps angered by the truth of the allegation, Coventry broke in to demand, “Who shall 
know our Censure, before the court pass it? Do you prophesy of yourselves?”40 Coventry 
also repeatedly rebuffed the defendants’ pleas that their words not be taken out of 
context, as seen in the following exchange:  
  Lord Keeper:  What say you, Mr. Burton, are you Guilty or not? 
Mr. Burton: My lord, I desire you not only to peruse my Book 
here and there, but every passage of it. 
Lord Keeper:  Mr. Burton, time is short, are you Guilty or not 
Guilty! What say you to that which was read?41  
 
Perhaps the result was not a foregone conclusion, but given the tenor of the proceedings, 
it is not difficult to believe that Dr. Bastwick’s suspicions were accurate. But despite 
Coventry’s aggressive tone in this highly-charged proceeding, his overall judicial 
temperament is probably better captured in the firm but measured admonition to the 
recalcitrant John Lilburn during his trial the following year, “Well, come, come . . . 
submit yourself unto the court.”42 
                                                          
40 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 723. 
41 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 723. 
42 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 1322. 
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 The other judge with the highest number of appearances in our sample is Henry 
Montagu, the first Earl of Manchester. Like Coventry, he had a family connection to the 
judiciary: his grandfather had been appointed Chief Justice of King’s Bench during 
Henry VIII’s reign. Montagu entered the Middle Temple in 1585, and was called to the 
bar in 1592. He was elected to the House of Commons regularly, beginning late in 
Elizabeth’s reign. The year 1603 was a good one for Montagu: he became recorder of 
London and obtained a knighthood from the new king. During the early 1600s, Montagu 
became involved in several joint-stock ventures and spent several years riding as a judge 
of the assizes, and by 1616 was in a position to spend the 10,000 l. He paid another 
20,000 l. to become Lord Treasurer, but was forced out in 1621, after only ten months on 
the job, thanks to the shifting allegiances of the Duke of Buckingham. Despite this 
setback, Montagu obtained the lord lieutenancy of Huntingdonshire in 1624, and, after 
recovering the duke’s favor was created Earl of Manchester in 1626 and appointed as 
Charles’ Lord Privy Seal in 1628.43  
 The timing of this last appointment is interesting, because in March of 1627 he 
and Coventry had blocked a government plan to punish loan refusers by pressing them 
into overseas military service. Brian Quintrell describes Montagu as a moderate, 
regarding the forced loan “as an exceptional measure in response to an immediate 
emergency,” not a new constitutional norm:  
With other moderates in the council, he drew freely on the advice of Sir 
Robert Cotton and made use of the precedents in his library in the search 
for compromise and common ground. His role in the two sessions of the 
                                                          
43 Montagu, Henry, first earl of Manchester (c. 1564–1642) in DNB. The foregoing discussion 
is taken primarily from Brian Quintrell’s thorough entry in the DNB.  
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parliament of 1628–9 was similarly constructive: both in his speeches and 
his contributions to conferences between the houses he showed the 
concern he shared with members anxious to preserve the integrity of the 
prerogative without damaging the liberties of the subject, as over the 
petition of right and the case of the five knights.44  
 
 Montagu may have been a man of moderation, but his sons were pulled to 
opposing extremes. Despite the family’s Calvinist inclinations, his son Wat had become a 
declared Roman Catholic—a circumstance that apparently drove Montagu to drink—
while his eldest son Edward, heir to his title as Earl of Manchester, became an officer in 
the Parliamentary Army.  
 As we saw in the Introduction, the Act of 1487 directed that two common law 
judges should form part of the Court of Star Chamber’s membership—although it does 
not seem that this rule was strictly observed. Sir Thomas Richardson, the judge with the 
third highest attendance record in our sample, changed hats during the period under 
consideration, transitioning from Chief Justice of Common Pleas to Chief Justice of 
King’s Bench in October of 1631. As the son of a Norfolk clergyman, Richardson came 
from a less well-to-do background than Coventry or Montagu. Perhaps for this reason, 
Richardson’s tone comes across as less superciliary than many of his colleagues.  
 After study at Cambridge, Richardson joined Lincoln’s Inn in 1587 and was 
called to the bar in 1595. Richardson’s rise was not meteoric, but his marriage and 
professional connections were eventually rewarded with a recommendation to become 
one of the crown’s ‘preferred’ candidates for Speaker of the House of Commons. 
                                                          
44 Montagu, Henry, first earl of Manchester (c. 1564–1642), in DNB. Quintrell also suggests 
that Montagu and Coventry “did not help their chances of major political influence in the 
personal rule by their determination to keep alive hopes of future parliaments after 1629.” 
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Richardson comes across as a colorful character in many stories, and in this case, he is 
said to have been “dragged, sobbing, towards the chair early in February 1621” protesting 
his unworthiness, in what was apparently perceived at the time as a bit of theater. He 
engaged in similar theatrics after being named Chief Justice of Common Pleas in 1626—
a position he must have badly wanted as he paid 17,000 l. to get it.45 
 Richardson seems to have been something of a coward. Quintrell reports that 
during a 1634 Star Chamber prosecution, Richardson seemed prepared to second Sir 
Robert Heath in refusing to grant a conviction on the basis of an ambiguous Elizabethan 
statute, “but Richardson, following him and hearing adverse reactions in court to Heath's 
ruling, weakly contended otherwise and so undermined the colleague whose reservations 
he had appeared to share.”46 But he could also be stubborn. In 1632, at the request of 
Somerset’s Puritan magistrates, Richardson issued an order suppressing “wakes, revels, 
and church ales in the interests of good order and Sabbath observance.” Archbishop Laud 
ordered Richardson to rescind this order and eventually called in the king for assistance. 
In Jams Rigg’s Dictionary of National Biography entry, he reports that Richardson 
responded to the king’s countermand by presenting the matter “before the justices and 
grand jury, professing his inability to comply with the royal mandate.” Richardson felt 
that because the Somerset order “had been made by the joint consent of the whole 
bench,” and was supported by precedents dating back to the reign of Elizabeth,” the king 
had no right to interfere. “This caused him to be cited before the council, reprimanded, 
                                                          
45 Richardson, Sir Thomas (bap. 1569, d. 1635) in DNB. 
46 Richardson, Sir Thomas (bap. 1569, d. 1635) in DNB. 
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and transferred to the Essex circuit.” This was considered a humiliating demotion, and 
Richarson supposedly “muttered as he left the council board,” 
 that he was “like . . . to be choked with the archbishop's lawn sleeves.”47 In view of this 
quarrel with William Laud, Richardon’s death in 1635 could only have helped to 
strengthen Laud’s position.  
The last judge we will mention here is Sir Robert Heath, whose presence is 
recorded in 12 of the 30 cases in our sample. This is only one more appearance than 
William Laud, but Heath did not join the Court of Star Chamber until October, 1631, 
when he took over Richardson’s old job as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Before 
becoming Chief Justice, Heath had previously worked as king’s attorney—prosecuting 
many cases in the Star Chamber—including, most famously, Thomas Darnel in 1627 (the 
Five Knights’ Case).48 In Darnel’s case, Heath had advanced the king’s argument that he 
was not bound to respect the writ of habeas corpus with respect to individuals detained 
by royal decree. John Selden, a lawyer for one of the accused knights, subsequently 
accused Heath of attempting “to alter the records in the case to establish a binding 
precedent so that men imprisoned by special command of the king could be held 
indefinitely.”49 Mark Kishlansky has sought to rehabilitate Heath’s reputation, suggesting 
that Selden may have intentionally misled the House of Commons “in order to inflame 
                                                          
47 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 48. (New York: MacMillan, 1895). Also 
available at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Richardson,_Thomas_(1569-1635)_(DNB00) 
48 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 1. 
49 Kishlansky, “Tyranny Denied,” 55.  
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moderate opinion”50 Kishlansky points to this incident as an example of the mutual 
distrust that resulted in the “breakdown of traditional government in the reign of Charles 
I.”51 Robert Heath may be our first example of the type of narrow royalist partisan we 
would expect to find based on traditional images of the Court of Star Chamber, but 
Heath’s royalism can be interpreted as an expression of what Paul Kopperman called his 
“preoccupation with order” and his self-image as a member of an elite whose function 
was to promote unity and social stability.52 This preoccupation was far from unique to 
Heath.   
Before turning to consider the court’s decided cases, it is important to remember 
that there were limits on the Court of Star Chamber’s authority to inflict corporal 
punishment. From comments such as those made by Justice Richardson during the 
sentencing phase of Alexander Leighton’s 1630 Star Chamber trial, it is clear that the 
court—whether by statute or immemorial custom—lacked the power to inflict capital 
punishment. Sir Edward Coke, an earlier Star Chamber judge, addressed this point 
directly in his Institutes of the Laws of England:   
Lastly, it remaineth to be seen what jurisdiction this court hath in 
punishment, and where, and in what cases this court may inflict 
punishment by pillory, papers, whipping, loss of ears, tacking of ears, 
stigmata in the face [i.e., branding], &c. (For it extendeth not to any 
offence that concerns the life of man or obtruncation of any member, the 
ears only excepted, and those rarely and in most heinous and detestable 
offences).53  
                                                          
50 Kishlansky, 72. 
51 Kishlansky, 83.  
52 Heath, Sir Robert (1575–1649) in DNB. 
53 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, IV (London: M. Flesher, 1644), 66. 
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Coke (or his editor) includes beside this text a marginal reference to “23 El. ca. 2” with 
the admonition, “note where he shall lose his ears for defamation of the queen.”54  
 
 
King’s Attorney v. Richard Chambers 
 
On September 28, 1628, Chambers was among a group of merchants summoned 
to appear before the Privy Council at Hampton Court. While there, he uttered “undutiful, 
seditious, and false words, That the Merchants are in no part of the world so screwed and 
wrung as in England; that in Turkey they have more encouragement.”55 These words, 
according to the government’s attorney, amounted to an “endeavor to alienate the good 
affection of his Majesties Subjects from his Majesty, and to bring a slander upon his just 
Government . . . .” Chambers admitted to making the comment “out of the great sense 
which he had of the injuries done him by the said Inferiour Officers.”56 Although these 
words could be construed as contempt of Court, spoken as they were in the presence of 
                                                          
54 See 23 Eliz. c. 2. in Statutes of the Realm, IV (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1963 [1819]), 
659. Available at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915519;view=1up;seq=753 The 
statute prescribes a series of increasingly draconian punishments for uttering ‘seditious words’ 
against the queen (although, in a nod, perhaps, to English notions of fair play and good 
sportsmanship, the statute contains a thirty-day statute of limitations). For the first offense, the 
offender was “to be set only upon the pillory . . . and there to have both his Eares cut of” unless 
he paid the requisite fine within two months. The second offense was a felony, for which the 
prescribed punishment was death and forfeiture of the felon’s estate.  
55 The Turkish analogy remained popular for several years. David Cressy relates the fate of a 
London physician, Robert Floyd, who in 1633 was charged “with ‘vain fancies’ against 
‘sovereignty itself ’ for saying ‘it was all one to be under the king and under the Turk’. David 
Cressy, Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, Seditious, and Treasonable Speech in Pre-Modern England 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 148.  
56 Rushworth, "Historical Collections: 1629," 662-691. BHO, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol1/pp662-691. 
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the Privy Councilors, Chambers could (and did) reasonably defend himself against the 
charge of sowing discord ‘among the People’ on the grounds that his audience was made 
up only  of high officials. In any event, the Turkish comparison touched a nerve. Charles 
himself made mention of Chambers’ case more than once in March 10, 1629, 
proclamation attempting to justify his decision to dissolve Parliament prematurely for the 
third time:57 
Yet for all this, the Bill of Tonnage and Poundage was laid aside, upon 
Pretence, they must first clear the Right of the Subject therein; under 
Colour whereof, they entertain the Complaints, not only of John Rolles, a 
Member of their House, but also of Richard Chambers, John Foukes, and 
Bartholomew Gilman, against the Officers of our Customs, for detaining 
their Goods, upon refusal to pay the ordinary Duty, accustomed to be paid 
for the same.58 
 
 
Charles was not finished. He complained that after “Suits were commenced in our Court 
of Star-chamber, against Richard Chambers, John Foukes, Bartholomew Gilman, and 
Richard Phillips, by our Attorney General [Robert Heath], for great Misdemeanours,” the 
late Parliament had taken the defendants under their protection claiming “Privilege of 
Parliament.” Charles was also irate that the House of Commons had resolved to send a 
letter in its name “unto the Lord Keeper of our Great Seal, that no Attachments should be 
granted out against the said Chambers, Foukes, Gilman, or Phillips, during their said 
Privilege of Parliament.” How dare the Commons “give Direction to any of our Courts at 
Westminster”? Not that the letter had actually been sent, but “if any such Letter had come 
                                                          
57 Rushworth, "Appendix: Charles I's Declaration on the dissolution of Parliament, 1628,", 1-
11. BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol1/pp1-11. 
58 Rushworth, "Appendix: Charles I's Declaration on the dissolution of Parliament, 1628," 1-11.  
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to the Lord Keeper, as it did not, he should have highly offended us if he had obeyed 
it.”59  
Charles could not have been more direct about his feelings about where the Lord 
Keeper’s loyalties should be—or about the result he expected when Star Chamber met to 
consider Chambers’ case in May:  
And if any factious Merchant will affront us, in a Thing so reasonable, and 
wherein we require no more, nor in no other Manner, than so many of our 
Predecessors have done, and have been dutifully obey'd: Let them not deceive 
themselves, but be assured, that we shall find honourable and just Means to 
support our Estate, vindicate our Sovereignty, and preserve the Authority which 
God hath put into our Hands.”60 
 
As has already been discussed, in many Star Chamber cases it is impossible to 
determine how the individual judges voted—or for that matter what was the ultimate 
disposition of the case. Fortunately, on occasion a complete report of the decision 
survives, including the one in this case. The editor of Cobbett’s State Trials chose to 
include “the names of each several person who gave sentence,” given the “great 
difference of opinion in the Court about the Fine” and because he deemed it “a 
remarkable case.”61  
As customary, Sir Francis Cottington, Charles’s Chancellor of the Exchequer 
since April of 1629, led the sentencing discussion.62 He recommended a 500 pound fine 
                                                          
59 Rushworth, “Appendix: Charles I's Declaration on the dissolution of Parliament, 1628,” 1-11. 
60 Rushworth, "Appendix: Charles I's Declaration on the dissolution of Parliament, 1628," 1-11.  
61 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 374. 
62From Prynne’s 1633 trial in Complete Collection of State Trials, 401. “The first was of 
Francis Lord Cottington, Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose turn was to begin first to speak, as 
being in the lowest degree of Quality by his Place. And commonly he that beginneth, as he 
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to the king and that Chambers be obliged to acknowledge his offence “at the council-
board, the Star-Chamber Bar, and the Exchange.” Sir Thomas Richardson, lord chief 
justice of the Common Pleas, and Sir Nicholas Hyde, lord chief justice of the King's-
Bench, joined Cottington in recommending a 500 l. fine to the king, but felt that directing 
Chambers “to desire the king's favour” would suffice (instead of a formal submission. 
The recommendations were as follows:   
Cottington        500 l.   full submission 
Richardson         500 l.   desire king's favour 
Hyde          500 l.   desire king's favour 
Sir John Cook, Secretary of State   1,000 l.   “ 
Sir Humphrey May, Chancellor   1,500 l.   full submission 
Sir Thomas Edmonds     2,000 l.  “ 
Sir Edward Barret     2,000 l.  “ 
Dr. Neal, Bishop of Winchester   3,000 l.  “ 
Dr. Laud, Bishop of London    3,000 l.  “ 
L. Carlton, Principal Secretary of State  3,000 l.  “ 
[George Hay?], Chancellor of Scotland  3,000 l.  “  
Earl of Holland     1,500 l.  “ 
Earl of Doncaster     1,500 l.  “ 
Earl of Salisbury     1,500 l.  “  
Earl of Dorset      3,000 l. “ 
Earl of Suffolk     3,000 l.  “ 
Earl of Mountgomery, Lord Chamberlain   1,500 l.  “ 
Earl of Arundel, Lord High Marshal    3,000 l.  “ 
Lord Montague, Lord Privy Seal    3,000 l.  “ 
Lord Conway      2,000 l.  “ 
Lord Weston, Lord Treasurer    3,000 l.  “ 
Lord Coventry, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal  1,500 l.  “ 
When there was a difference of opinion among the judges as to the fine, it was 
customary for the difference to be resolved in the king’s favor, and in Chambers’ case the 
                                                          
openeth the matter at large, so he inclineth thereby many Lords to forbear making of Speeches, 
and only to declare themselves to concur in Sentence with him that began first, or with some 
other Lord that spake before, as their Judgments lead them. 
 31 
fine was settled to 2,000 l. The real sticking point, however, in which all but the two chief 
justices concurred, was the requirement that Chambers make a “submission”. (As we will 
see in Chapter Four, this was a routine matter in cases of libel and scandal.) Attorney 
General Heath prepared a draft of the Submission and had it sent to the warden of the 
Fleet. The words to be put in Chambers’ mouth were as follows:63 
I Richard Chambers, of London, merchant, do humbly acknowledge, that 
whereas upon an information exhibited against me by the king's attorney-
general, I was in Easter term last sentenced by the honourable court of 
Star-Chamber, for that in September last, 1628, being convented before 
the lords and others of his majesty's most honourable privy-council-board, 
upon some speeches then used concerning the merchants of this kingdom, 
and his majesty's well and gracious usage of them; did then, and there, in 
insolent, contemptuous, and seditious manner, falsly and maliciously say 
and affirm, ‘ that they,' meaning the merchants, are in no parts of the 
world so screwed and ‘wrung as in England; and that in Turkey “they have 
more encouragement.' And . . . now I the said R. Chambers, in obodience 
to the sentence of the said honourable court, do humbly confess and 
acknowledge the speaking of these words afore said, for the which I was 
so charged, and am heartly sorry for the same . . . 
 
The only problem was that Chambers wasn’t heartily sorry. He was heartily outraged. He 
did sign the document, but above his signature wrote: “All the abovesaid contents and 
Submission, ‘I Richard Chambers do utterly abhor and detest, as most unjust and false; 
and never till death will acknowledge any part thereof. Rich. Chambers.”64 Needless to 
say, Chambers did not earn his release from the Fleet.  
Sir Thomas Richardson, at this time Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and 
Sir Nicholas Hyde, Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, recommended the smallest 
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(though still hefty) fines of 500 l. each and did not join in the order for Chambers to sign 
a Submission, requiring him only to ‘desire the king’s favor’. Those recommending the 
highest fine of 3,000 l. were the two bishops (Neal, Bishop of Winchester and Laud, at 
this time still Bishop of London, Principal Secretary of State Carlton, the Chancellor of 
Scotland, the earls of Dorset, Suffolk, and Arundel, Lord Montagu, and Weston, the Lord 
Treasurer. This group may be safely regarded as the court’s political ‘hardliners’. The 
next two cases will introduce us to what might be called the ‘social’ hardliners (Falkland) 
and the ‘religious’ hardliners (Sherfield). These are the three ‘fault lines’ along which the 
Star Chamber judges divided.  
 
Falkland v. Savage, et al. 
 In one of many cases in which the Star Chamber sat to defend one of its own 
members from a perceived slight, in the Easter term of 1631, the court heard Falkland v. 
Savage, et al. The facts of the case are somewhat complicated, but its principal feature 
was an accusation Lord Falkland, Lord Deputy of Ireland, had arranged to frame a 
freeholder named Philip Bushell with the murder of his wife. Because the crime was 
characterized as ‘treason’, Lord Falkland was in a position to order the sheriff to 
sequester Bushell’s goods, chattels, lands, and tenements (which included a castle). A 
variety of rumors began to circulate in Ireland, and then Bushell’s son (who, in addition 
to losing a mother and a father, had just been disinherited by the government), “came into 
England, and procured a Petition to be presented to his Majesty, containing divers 
Grievances touching the Execution of the said Bushell his Father . . . .” After the petition 
to the king was ignored, Bushell planned to “present his said Grievance to the Commons 
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House of Parliament then assembled,” but on the advice of Sir Arthur Savage, Bushell 
presented the petition instead to the Duke of Buckingham. The charges in Star Chamber 
were that through the petition Bushell had ‘subtly traduced’ Falkland and his 
management of affairs in Ireland by asking for the establishment of a “commission to 
examine the supposed practice.” Savage then sought “cunningly to entrap the Plaintiff 
[Falkland]” by suggesting that instead of having a commission appointed the Duke 
should just write a letter to Falkland “to cause some Relief to be given to Bushell's Wife 
and Children, and so to stop their Mouths . . ..” This was essentially blackmail, of course, 
and if Falkland had acceded to the request “it would have argued him foully guilty.”  
Buckingham obliged, allowing Sir Arthur to dictate the letter to his secretary. 
Importantly for the Star Chamber matter, Savage had then vouched for the truth of the 
claims in Bushell’s original petition “tho he knew them to be false.” Bushell took 
possession of the letter, but never gave it to Falkland. Instead, after Buckingham died, 
Bushel opened the letter, wrote yet another petition, and presented the whole package to 
the House of Commons “where it was publickly divulged to the Dishonour of the 
Plaintiff.”  
The whole thing seems to have been turned into an elaborate hit-job on Falkland, 
engineered by his enemies, Savage and Lord Mountnorris, and the Court of Star Chamber 
seems to have kept this in mind when it came time to deliberate. Lord Cottington 
evidently sympathized with Bushell, whom he considered “the wretched sonne of a dead 
father, 80 yeares olde at his death.” Cottington was inclined to make allowance for a man 
who had seen “his father dead, his goods seized.” Under such circumstances, “there 
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should be more severity used, but more mercy, if offende in any parte, in the mercifull 
parte.”65 Even so, Cottington would have imposed a total of 1000 l. in fines and damages. 
Savage’s reputation as a solder seems to have argued in his favor to some extent, but 
even so, Cottington would have awarded 4000 l. in fine and damages.  
Richardson also felt that Bushell should be punished, “though he be a sonne, and 
hath the warrant of nature to doe what he can for defence of his father’s reputation.” But 
the ‘impudent’ attempt to prey upon Falkland’s estate “is not to be given way to.” 
Richardson recognized Bushell as “a poore and indigent man,” and felt that a the fine 
already suggested by Cottington would suffice. But in addition to the fine,  
I hold fitt he should goe to the pillory, and his offence to be declared in 
paper wherfore he standeth there, and that he should be bound to the good 
behaviour, for he saith he will mainteyne the petition with his life; and to 
suffer inprisonment at the King's pleasure. 66 
 
Richardson was impressed that Savage had been a “valiant man in his youth,” but “the 
dignity of his person” increased his offense. Moreover, Savage had also indirectly 
insulted the king:  
the offence is not donne to my Lord Deputy onely, but it reflecteth upon 
his Majesty. What will the people say that the King should send such a 
deputy, occulere et possidere, never heard of since Jezabell's tyme. This is 
directly against the Statute of Westminster against telling of false newes, 
and what false newes more prejudiciall?67 
 
Here Richardson is clearly invoking the law of Scandalum Magnatum examined in 
Chapter One. Given the dignity of those whose reputations were besmirched, Richardson 
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recommended doubling the fine proposed by Cottington. However, there was to be no 
pillory for the wayward knight.  
Chief Justice Hyde gave his sentence next. Although he believed Savage to be the 
greatest offender, he felt that 1000 l. each for fine and damages would suffice on the 
theory that “it is not the greatnesse of damages will repair my Lord's honor, but the 
clearing of his justice.” Hyde also felt that the jury in the elder Bushell’s treason trial had 
been browbeaten into delivering a verdict. Therefore, “though Bushell be poore and 
despicable, yet being wronged, it is fitt he should submitt himselfe to my Lord Falkland, 
and I discharge him of all the rest.”68  
Sir John Coke shared Justice Hyde’s reservations about the conduct of the 
underlying treason trial. “Justice is to proceede moderately,” he cautioned, “and if we 
have but an apprehension of condemning this man we shall doe him injustice, although it 
fall out to be his just censure.” Even so, Coke concurred in the sentence recommended by 
Cottington as to both Savage and Bushell, finding that Bushell had an entire year-and-a-
half to cool down before he delivered the petition. But Richardson’s idea of setting 
Bushell in the pillory seems to have been dropped. 
Sir Thomas Jarmin had only been present for a portion of the trial, and he 
therefore abstained from passing sentence.  
Henry Vane spoke next, like Hyde believing Savage to be the principal culprit—
although he had been “very attentive and would have been glad to have taken hould of 
any thing for his advantage and excuse . . . .” But since he hadn’t heard anything in the 
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way of an excuse, Vane upped the total penalty assessed against Savage to 5000 l. 1000u. 
As for Bushell, “his case is to be lamented, I confesse; he may be wronged.” However, 
that was no excuse for slandering Falkland. Vane therefore concurred with the highest 
fine.69 (It was a regular practice at this point in the sentencing for the judges to pick a 
sentence they had already heard and agree with it—probably in the interest of time.) 
Sir Thomas Edmonds felt it “needful that a remarkable example be layd upon the 
raysers of such and soe great a scandal,” noting that Falkland had a long career and had 
“ever knowen to be free from covetousnesse.” Edmonds agreed with the highest fine and 
damages against Sir Arthur, but suggested that Bushell’s penalty should be lowered to a 
500 l. fine (no damages) “because of his pressures.”70 
Lord Newburgh apparently felt that there was nothing left to say at this point that 
wouldn’t be redundant, so he simply concurred in Henry Vane’s sentence.  
The Bishop of Winchester (Richard Neile), however, felt there was plenty left to 
say. He did not want to excuse the trial judge in the elder Bushell’s case if there had been 
a miscarriage of justice, but still he worried that “it will prove a president of great danger 
to all Judges for a cause after 7 or 8 yeares upon a backe reckoninge to be thus scanned . . 
. .” Neile concurred with the highest fine for Savage, and thought he would make a last-
ditch effort to resurrect Richardson’s idea of corporal punishment for Bushell.71 (Neile, 
after all, had a hand in England’s last heresy burning in 1612).   
                                                          
69 Gardiner, ed., Reports, 24. 
70 Gardiner, ed., Reports, 25. 
71 Gardiner, ed., Reports, 26. 
 37 
Thomas Wentworth, the future Lord Strafford (but Lord President of the Council 
of the North in 1631) lamented first the loss of revenue to the king in the way the 
executed Bushell’s estate had been seized, then the slander of Falkland, and only then “an 
innocent olde man brought with sorrowe to his grave.” Wentworth would make 
allowance for Bushell as “a sonne robbed of his Father,” and therefore recommended the 
original fine suggested by Cottington, but added that “he make this recognition heere at 
this barre and at the Assizes at Kildare.” Wentworth agreed with the highest fine for 
Savage.72  
  Viscount Dorchester could “not but pity” Bushell, voting with the lowest fine. 
And as for Savage, Dorchester “had rather have seen him as heretofore in the head of 
English troopes nobly demeaning himselfe then heere to sentence him.” Nevertheless, he 
felt it necessary to agree with the highest sentence. 73 
The Earl of Danby also concurred in the original sentence against Savage, and 
agreed with the members of the court who felt that, on the whole, Bushell’s situation was 
to be pitied, and therefore felt that the 500 l. fine was adequate. Danby also suggested 
that the attorney general should be directed “to bring that other cause against the Judge to 
hearing.” Apparently Danby did not share Bishop Neile’s concerns about hauling judges 
into court over old misdeeds.74  
The Earl of Dorset agreed: “It is well donne to have an eye to the absent Judge.” 
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He also felt it necessary to lament the need to censure a war hero, but as Savage was the 
“contriver of this scandall, as infamous a scandall as ever was,” who practiced “to shed 
bloud, and that with the sword of justice, and to take Naboth's Vineyard from him,” he 
deserved the highest censure. Bushell, however, “because of the lawe of nature” should 
not be penalized for presenting a petition, and therefore would not have fined him.  
The Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, likewise believed they had identified the 
real malefactor in Savage, and therefore would have chosen not to punish any of the other 
defendants.  
The Earl of Arundel considered Savage a ‘malicious enemy’ of Falkland and 
joined in the highest fine. Bushell, on the other hand, was “an unfortunate sonne of an 
unhappy father, being provoked, he did well to complaine,”—just not about Lord 
Falkland. No pillory or damages, but 500 l. fine. 
Manchester, agreed that he could “not blame a sonne for complayning of the 
unjust death of his father.” But Bushell seemed willing enough to “have sould his father's 
bloud for bread” and therefore deserved the 500 l. fine. Apparently Manchester felt that 
no one had yet recommended an adequate punishment for Savage, he raised his damages 
by another 1000 l.75 
 Coventry, as usual, voted last, reflecting at length on the trial judge’s alleged 
improprieties and conjuring up images of jurors being beaten and pinched, concluding, 
“[I]t seemeth to me not soe hard a case that a Judge should answere his evil doings,” and 
“if a Jury acquitt a man contrary to their evidence it is punishable heere.” Coventry seems 
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to have changed his mind in the process of sentencing Bushell. At first he voted for a 500 
l. fine, being careful to add that he was not sentencing someone for petitioning the king, 
but for passing along scandalous information to Buckingham (this seems like splitting 
hairs given the massive influence Buckingham wielded). Coventry also made it clear, 
however, that he was making an exception for the amount of suffering Bushell had 
already endured:  
“This cause moveing every man to commisseration and pitty, I goe noe higher els I 
should have censured him deepely.” Later, however, Coventry backed off the fine, noting 
that Bushell was a poor man and that the fine would “come to nothing” anyway, and “in 
consideration therefore of his unparallelled dammage I should spare him.” Coventry 
would even have imposed a lighter fine on Savage, but agreed with the highest 
recommendation of damages to Falkland.76 
After all the recommendations were sorted, Savage was ordered to pay a fine of 
2000 l. to the King, and 3000 l. in damages to Falkland. Bushell seems to have spent 
some time in jail in addition to being ordered to pay a fine of 500 l.  
Falkland’s case offers several insights into the collective ‘mind’ of the Court of 
Star Chamber. First, it seems abundantly clear from following the sentencing from 
beginning to end that the judges tried to achieve a measure of balance and 
proportionality. Falkland was probably a personal friend to many of the judges, and they 
believed a great injury had been done to his reputation, but the general sense of the court 
was that Bushell’s offense should be dealt with compassionately in light of the horrible 
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experience he had lived through. They even seemed genuinely to regret having to pass 
judgment on Savage. Only two of the judges, Richardson and Bishop Neile, ventured to 
recommend corporal punishment. Second, the judges did not seem to arrive with their 
minds made up about the outcome—as evident in Coventry’s apparent change of heart 
while he was giving his sentence. Third, as Justice Richardson’s remarks made clear, the 
judges believed they were applying a set of established legal principles to the facts of the 
case, although legal rules often seem buried so deep in Star Chamber discussions that 
they are difficult to identify. And finally, given the strong reactions of several judges to 
the alleged abuses in the elder Bushell’s treason trial, it seems that the judges of Star 
Chamber were not purely interested in saving face at all costs.  
 
King’s Attorney v. Sherfield 
The final case I want to consider is that of Henry Sherfield, the Recorder of 
Salisbury, who was brought before the Court of Star Chamber in 1632 on an Information 
brought by Attorney General Robert Heath. By the time the case came up for hearing he 
had been promoted to Chief Justice of Common Pleas and had become a regular member 
of the Court of Star Chamber—but his prior involvement with the case did not prevent 
him from ruling in the matter. Sherfield’s case is not a speech case except in a very 
tangential way, but I include it because it demonstrates the existence of what, for lack of 
better terms, might be called the Puritan-Arminian divide on the court. At the end of the 
case, Coventry remarked that a “great audience consisting of gentlemen from all parts of 
the kingdom,” had witnessed the proceedings, and he wanted to satisfy everyone in the 
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room of two points: first, that “we think it not fit nor lawful to represent the Deity by 
picture,” and that the court was united in condemning “Romish superstition”; and second, 
“on the other side, that we are resolutely bent to maintain the government by the reverend 
Fathers of the Church, the bishops.77 The Court of Star Chamber, in other words, stood 
firmly in the camp of Protestant Episcopacy.  
As in Falkland’s case, the details of Sherfield’s case are messy and need not 
detain us here. Although nominally about Sherfield, the real issue in the case was not 
Sherfield’s window smashing. Sherfield himself was an outstanding and well-respected 
citizen throughout a long life, and he had obtained permission from the local vestry 
before smashing the idolatrous image of God the Father “in the form of an old man in 
blue and red.”78 The real issue, then, was the vestry’s decision to ignore the Bishop of 
Salisbury’s inhibition by giving Sherfield license to destroy the glass. This was a minor 
act of insubordination, but one that nevertheless struck at the heart of episcopacy. One of 
the major battles amongst the Star Chamber judges was whether or not Sherfield should 
be allowed to retain his position as Recorder—a battle the ‘Puritan’ faction won by the 
narrowest possible margin.    
 As in Falkland’s case, Lord Cottington, Chancellor of the Exchequer, ruled first, 
condemning Sherfield’s behavior the act of ‘Puritans and Brownists’. Cottington mocked 
the idea that Sherfield was a ‘wise man’ ‘learned in the laws’, suggesting it would have 
been a better defense to plead madness. Cottington thought Sherfield’s offense serious 
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enough that he should lose his job, urging his fellow judges to “take order that he be 
justice no longer.” In addition, Sherfield was to give a public apology and pay a fine of 
1000 l.79 
 Robert Heath was next to speak—and given his prior involvement in the case it is 
perhaps surprising that he should be one of the most lenient. Heath started out by 
suggesting that some of the charges in the bill had not been proved at trial, adding “I must 
confess, I was informed that the Cause was much fouler than it is . . . .” He also 
enumerated several mitigating factors, such as the prosecuting attorney’s failure to prove 
that Sherfield technically knew that he was violating the bishop’s inhibition—although, 
as the Laudian faction pointed out, Sherfield must at least have strongly suggested the 
bishop’s feelings in the matter. Heath pointedly agreed that the window itself was 
‘scandalous’ and only found fault with Sherfield for acting ‘privately’—although this, 
too, seems to have been something of a fiction. Heath believed that Sherfield’s ‘crime’ 
had no bearing on his job as recorder (another fiction!) and therefore recommended only 
a public acknowledgement and a fine of 500 marks.80  
 Justice Thomas Richardson (who had offered to have Bushell stand in the pillory), 
agreed that idolatry was the cardinal sin. But at the same time, “the bishop, the supreme 
ordinary in his diocese, and the arch deacon, who is ‘magnus oculus episcopi,’ are the 
proper agents in a work of reformation; what mischiefs would else ensue?” Sherfield’s 
offense was, at bottom, one of “arrogating to himself power and authority not belonging 
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to him.” Even so, Richardson invoked the ‘rule’ that punishment must be for correction, 
not ruination. He therefore opted only for a fine of 500 l., between the numbers suggested 
Cottington and Heath, but suggested that Sherfield also be imprisoned for a period of 
time.   
 Secretary Windebank did not indulge an any remarks, but in addition to agreeing 
with Cottington’s sentence—fine and loss of the recordership—and with Richardson’s 
suggestion to jail Sherfield. Despite his silence, Windebank’s subsequent conversion to 
Roman Catholicism may offer a hint as to the reasons for his sentence in Sherfield’s case.  
 Secretary John Coke had a very different idea about what the punishment should 
be: an acknowledgement to the Bishop of Salisbury. Although he recognized the danger 
of seeming to punish Sherfield too lightly—“the danger of example to encourage others 
to break down such windows”—this danger paled in comparison to the “occasion of 
triumph to ill-affected persons” that would result “if this court should too severely punish 
an error in pulling that down which the church disalloweth.”81 
 Sir Thomas Jarmin followed: Not wanting to “say anything to encourage those 
hot-spirited men” (Sherfield and his ilk), he would not say much at all. However, he 
found Justice Heath’s argument convincing and agreed with his (light) sentence. (Sir 
Thomas Edmonds, who spoke after Vane, also adopted Heath’s ruling as his own.)  
 Sir Henry Vane found it difficult to believe that Sherfield, being a lawyer, was 
ignorant that he was violating the bishop’s injunction, but Vane had encountered 
Sherfield professionally and had an otherwise favorable impression of him. Vane thought 
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the 1000 l. fine and an acknowledgement to the bishop an adequate punishment.  
 Then it was William Laud’s turn and, as usual, he offered a disquisition on the 
history of imagery, noting, for example that in “Tertullian’s time (who was one of the 
ancientest  Fathers) there was painted upon the Chalice the picture of the Shepherd 
bringing home the lost sheep upon his shoulders . . . .” Laud suggested that it was only by 
God’s mercy that Sherfield hadn’t “broken his back upon the edge of the pew,” and noted 
that Sherfield had not even acknowledged his fault—instead he had claimed to be 
“persecuted for God’s cause.” Laud therefore concurred with Cottington in the 1000 l. 
fine and loss of the recordership. 82  
 Wentworth followed, comparing Sherfield to Uzziah, who was struck dead when 
he stretched out his hand to touch the Ark of God with a good intention. He condemned 
the vestries’ “frequent and ordinary transcending their power,” and suggested that it was 
“high time that the bishops be directed by the king's majesty, to regulate all such things, 
and to reduce all these vestry-men into order and obedience.” In a slap at Coke, 
Wentworth added, “I shall not forbear to punish an offence of this dangerous 
consequence . . . for fear of giving an occasion of triumph to some.” He followed every 
recommendation that had been suggested (although it is not clear that he intended to vote 
for imprisonment).83 
 The next three members to vote (there were several abstentions) passed their 
sentences without comment: Lord Falkland and the Earl of Devonshire agreed with 
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Cottington, and Lord Wimbleton with Heath.  
 The Earl of Dorset complained that the king’s case was overblown. Sherfield 
acted with “a little too much zeal,” but with a tender conscience. Dorset also noted the 
mitigating fact that although Sherfied was obviously a Puritan, he was a conformist. 
Dorset insisted that his opinion was not motivated by fear of what “three or four Papists” 
or “three or four Schisinaticks” might think. But Dorset did hope to “avoid the tumults of 
the rude ignorant people in the countries where this gentleman dwelleth, where he hath 
been a good governor . . .” and for that reason suggested that no punishment beyond an 
acknowledgement should be necessary.  
 The Earl of Arundel tersely faulted Sherfield for keeping his conscience bottled 
up for 20 years instead of bringing the matter of the window before the proper authorities. 
Instead, Sherfield had proceeded “in a fanatical humour” and should therefore receive the 
punishment first suggested by Cottington.  
 Manchester found no fault in Sherfield’s zeal against idolatry, but suggested that 
he had been dishonest about gaining the vestry’s permission to remove the window, and 
that he “would neglect authority, which is near Contempt.” Like Coventry, Manchester 
eager that “[a]ll may take notice, that our votes are to maintain order and government, yet 
not to uphold superstition.” And so, Sherfield was to make an acknowledgement to the 
bishop.  
 Dr. Neale, Archbishop of York, also agreed to Cottington’s original 
recommendation: 1000 l. fine, and loss of the recordership. Perhaps, not to be outdone by 
Laud, Neale also took a long time to reach his decision. His main objective was to 
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reiterate that the vestry “hath no power to make reformation”.  
 Coventry concluded the proceedings by circling back to Heath’s formalistic logic, 
emphasizing, for example, that there was no formal proof that Sherfield had knowledge 
of the injunction. Moreover, Coventry observed that it was the depiction in the glass that 
was at issue, for “if he had taken down white glass, I do not see any reason why I should 
sentence him.” Again, probably acutely aware of the crowd from across the kingdom who 
had shown up for Sherfield’s trial, Coventry was careful to acknowledge that “council on 
both sides have carried themselves in the cause extremely well . . . .” In the end, however, 
he had to make a ruling, and so he sided with Sir John Coke in ordering “no Fine at 
all.”84    
 The final tally was nine votes for a 1000 l. fine, removing Sherfield as recorder, 
binding him to good behavior, and compelling him to make acknowledgement, and nine 
others, including that of the Lord Keeper, for a private acknowledgement to the Bishop of 
Sarum. Because the second group was divided over the amount of the fine, however, 
Sherfield was ordered to pay 500 l.—Richardson’s amount—“because according to the 
rules and orders of the court of Star-Chamber, when there is a difference of fines in an 
odd, the king is to have the middle fine.” Sherfield also spent some time in the Fleet.  
 
 The three cases we have just examined collectively illustrate the danger of 
painting with too broad a brush when we picture ‘the’ Court of Star Chamber during the 
late 1620s and early 1630s. It is fair to say that a majority of the court’s membership 
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shared what might be called a broadly ‘royalist’ outlook—a point of view that valued, 
above all, the maintenance of order and the preservation of established authority. And yet 
the fault lines that ran through English society in the decades preceding the Civil War are 
also visible among the judges of the Court of Star Chamber itself. As members of the 
ruling aristocracy, these men had enough in common that they could unanimously 
condemn radicals like Alexander Leighton and William Prynne, in whose strident 
opinions they perceived the germs of violent revolution. But the case of Richard 
Chambers suggests that many of the judges felt a certain measure of sympathy for the 
moderate parliamentary opposition, while Henry Sherfield’s case reveals a court almost 
equally divided between Puritan and Arminian opinion. While the implications of these 
divisions are not altogether obvious, it seems reasonable to conclude that the unifying 
force amongst the judges of the Court of Star Chamber was not religion or royalism, but, 
as illustrated in Lord Falkland’s case, respect. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
STAR CHAMBER IN ACTION: 
PART I, ‘PRIVATE’ SPEECH CASES 
 
 
But in crimes fit to be made examples, the Commonwealth hath an 
interest, which is the great subject of this court . . . .85 
 
- William Hudson (c. 1630) 
 
 
 
We are indebted for much of our knowledge of the proceedings of this period to a 
young law student, John Rushworth (born c. 1612 and called to the bar in 1647). A 
careful observer and copious note-taker, he informs his readers that he 
did personally attend and observe all Occurrences of moment during the 
Eleven years Interval of Parliament, in the Star-Chamber, Court of 
Honour, and Exchequer-Chamber, when all the Judges of England met 
there upon extraordinary Cases; at the Council Table, when great Causes 
were heard before the King and Council.86   
 
Other responsibilities must have begun pressing in on Rushworth in the mid-1630s, 
because his reports of the cases in Star Chamber end abruptly in 1636. Rushworth is 
connected in another way to our present topic: in April of 1644, the “House of Commons 
appointed Rushworth licenser to the press with responsibility for pamphlets and 
newsbooks.”87 Writing sometime after William Prynne’s second Star Chamber trial in 
1637, Rushworth commented on the lack of good information about the Court: 
There is little mention made of this Court, either in Reports, or Treatises 
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of the Law, except now and then dispersedly in some one or two Causes, 
in an Age where it is mentioned rather, as it seemeth, to manifest to 
Posterity that there was such a Court, than to enlighten the World with the 
lawful Power, Authority, and Jurisdiction thereof.88 
 
For no period is there greater truth to this remark than the one under consideration here. 
The British National Archives hold most of the extant records pertaining to the court. 
STAC 8, the collection from the reign of James I, contains over 8600 files of 
informations, answers, depositions, etc. Unfortunately, STAC 9, containing records of 
Star Chamber proceedings from the reign of Charles I, contains only 29 case files. All 29 
have been catalogued by party name and case type, by which means it is possible to 
conclude that only one of the STAC 9 cases, Thelwall v. Hollman (late 1620s), is a 
‘speech case’ of the kind we have been examining. The case arises out of a libel on Sir 
Eubule Thelwall’s conduct as a Master in Chancery in a previous lawsuit between Philip 
Hollman and Thomas Gotte.89 Fortunately, other collections exist from which we can 
gain some understanding of how Star Chamber actually functioned. The names of most of 
these collections appear in the bibliography, but my study has been based primarily on 
the reported cases transcribed in Rushworth, including descriptive summaries of several 
cases for each year from 1625 to 1636, a collection of manuscript reports covering the 
years 1631 and 1632 compiled by Samuel Gardiner for the Selden Society in 1886 (these 
cases overlap those of Rushworth, but occasionally contain additional details), and the 
handful of major political cases contained in Cobbett’s State Trials. Cobbett’s reports are 
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rich in detail, and it is unfortunate that so few Star Chamber cases appear in the 
collection. It is difficult to determine the exact number of cases filed and brought to 
hearing before the Court of Star Chamber during the reign of Charles I. In 1939, Henry E. 
I. Phillips published a study on Star Chamber during the period 1630-41, in which he 
identified at least 308 cases as having been heard in Star Chamber between March of 
1629 and March of 1640.90 Of these, the nature of the case is discernible in at least 284 
matters, and at least some aspect of the disposition is known in roughly 236 of these. 
Phillips found that 66 of the cases in his study involved a judicial response to ‘violent 
outrage’, representing a much smaller proportion of the total number of cases than in the 
time of Elizabeth.91 Fifty-three of the cases (18 percent) in Phillips’ study involved 
charges of conspiracy, which represents a dramatic increase from the 2 percent of cases 
heard in Elizabeth’s Star Chamber. Another seventeen cases in the period 1630 and 1641 
are known to have involved ‘contempt of royal Proclamations and Orders’. The two 
categories we are most interested in at present, libel and scandal, made up a total of 41 
cases. Assuming Phillips’ numbers are accurate, this means that a minimum of 15 percent 
of Star Chamber’s business directly involved the punishment of words, spoken or written. 
 
Private Libel Suits in Rushworth, 1625-1636 
 
 The political trials rightly attract the lion’s share of the historical attention, and 
they are examined as a class below. But in order to recover the contemporary ‘meaning’ 
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of the punishments meted out by the Court of Star Chamber to those who, by written or 
spoken word, intentionally or otherwise, became the enemies of the royalist 
establishment—Leighton, Prynne, Burton, and Bastwick, or smaller fry like Richard 
Chambers—we should contextualize these judgments as much as possible within the 
framework of the court’s ordinary (it may be too much to say ‘standard’) practices when 
confronting the less sensational libel cases that came before it.  
Rushworth wrote summaries of about 218 Star Chamber cases during the period 
1625-1636. As mentioned above, Henry Phillips found that at least 308 cases came to a 
hearing in Star Chamber during the period 1629–1640,92 and using the number 308 as a 
benchmark (although we are dealing with different opening and closing dates), it is 
possible to estimate that in Rushworth’s reports we have descriptions of at least seven out 
of every cases heard in Star Chamber during the period 1625-1636. Rushworth’s reports 
should therefore be regarded as a reliable sample from which to draw general conclusions 
about the court’s business during the first half of Charles I’s reign.     
Only about 35 of the cases in Rushworth (less than one-fifth of the total) can 
properly be considered ‘speech cases’ (i.e., cases in which libel, slander, scandal, etc. is a 
central issue), and only ten of these involve what the court considered “meer Libel and 
Slander.” 93 The remaining 25 speech cases fall along a spectrum between what we might 
call ‘marginally political’ cases to the clearly political cases against Leighton and Prynne, 
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et al. These cases may be further subdivided into three rough categories, including: 
punishment of what would now be called contempt of court; punishment for slander of 
the great lords of the realm; and punishment of ‘seditious’ expression—that is, expression 
tending to undermine or subvert the established order in some way. Each category is 
examined in turn.  
 Beverly v. Power is the first speech case in Rushworth’s reports. It was heard 
during the Easter term of 1625—that is, around the time of Charles I’s accession. As with 
many of the ‘private libels’ heard in Star Chamber, Beverly is not purely a speech case. 
Probably the only reason it ended up in court is that along with offensive speech there 
was an assault—several assaults, actually. Power had assaulted Beverly on more than one 
occasion, once spitting in his face, and once kicking him “with his Spurs as he follow’d 
him up Sir James Leigh’s Stairs.” Beverly retaliated by charging Power and his associates 
“with other foul Crimes, whereof they made no manner of proof, but deserted it, at the 
hearing.” Apparently Beverly was simply attempting to smear Power’s reputation, but in 
any event he fined 500 l. “for meer Libel and Slander” and ordered to pay 500 marks to 
the ‘injured’ Defendants. Lest we conclude too hastily that here we have evidence of a 
miscarriage of justice, Rushworth notes that the Defendants were fined as well,94 but 
from the point of view of Rushworth, the young law student, the fine to the Plaintiff is 
probably what caught his attention.  
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The following winter, in Hilary term 1626, the Star Chamber heard Cumbrie v. 
York. The Defendant was a knight, Sir John York, who had been hunting Cumbrie’s deer 
without permission. After a hunting party including the younger John York was 
confronted by Cumbrie’s servants,“Sir John in a haughty manner sent the Plaintiff word 
he would hunt and kill Deer there if he could.” Sir John, his son, and another man were 
convicted “for this hunting, and using braving and provoking Speeches.” The lords had 
them thrown in the Fleet to cool their heels, and fines were assessed commensurate with 
the Defendants’ relative net worth: “Sir John fined 200 l. Fenton 100 l. and John York 50 
l.”95 
One year later, in 1627, the court heard Frize v. Bennet a case in which, for once, 
no violence seems to have been threatened. Bennet had published (either verbally or in 
writing) libelous songs such as, “A proper Song of a great Blockhead Woollen-Draper, 
dwelling in Holborn, who gave a Tailor's Wife a yard of old Freize for a Jerkin.” 
Bennet’s ballad “contained obscene and scurrilous matter, not fit to be recited,” but “the 
Court would give the Plaintiff no Damages, because he took delight in repetition of the 
Libel, and because he was of suspected Life and Conversation.”96 Perhaps the judges of 
Star Chamber secretly enjoyed a good pun.97  
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The following term (Easter, 1627), the court heard the first of the ‘political’ cases 
that will be discussed below—Whitache (contempt) and Perkins (Scandal of his Majesty). 
Indeed, perhaps because of the intensifying struggle between king and Parliament over 
Buckingham and the Forced Loan,98 Rushworth includes no private speech cases during 
any of the following three years. This period covers the convening and dissolution of 
Charles’ third and final Parliament and the opening of the Personal Rule, and perhaps the 
political tension in the air is the reason Rushworth’s reports focus instead on political (or 
quasi-political) speech cases instead. These include Mady’s case (Easter, 1628) involving 
a fight over a parsonage that ended in contempt of High Commission, Heron and Banier 
(Michaelmas, 1628) for false news about the death of Buckingham, the revealing Richard 
Chambers’ case (Easter, 1629), analyzed in depth below; and from the same term Maud’s 
case (in which the Defendant alleged that the King attended Mass with the Queen), and 
Lord Savile’s case (filing, but failing to prosecute, a ‘libelous bill’). It is also possible, of 
course, that fewer private libel cases were brought in Star Chamber during these years.   
The following year, 1630, was the year in which Star Chamber inflicted its 
infamous punishments on Alexander Leighton, but that same year it heard a large number 
of ‘contempt’ cases, including a prosecution for ‘scandal’ of Lord Coventry, a slander of 
a Master of Chancery, and a slander of two Justices in Flintshire. And in 1631 Star 
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Chamber heard a case in which words turned violent with the result that a Justice was 
assaulted.   
These cases illustrate a point that will be made in more detail below: the lords and 
ministers who sat as judges in Star Chamber were quick to protect those in authority from 
criticism. However, the Court of Star Chamber also occasionally punished those in 
authority who abused their power. During Easter Term, 1631, the Star Chamber judges 
entertained the case of an attorney named Caston against a Justice of the Peace (a knight 
named Hitcham)99 involving the publication of ‘libelous Article’s against the Plaintiff.’ 
This case could just as easily have been included among the ‘contempt’ cases, but in this 
case, it was the representative of the law who had demonstrated his contempt for the legal 
process:  
The Defendant the morning before he went to the Sessions, being a Justice 
of the Peace, received scandalous and libellous Articles against the 
Plaintiff, carried them to the Sessions in his Pocket; and in open Court, in 
disgrace of the Plaintiff, pulled them out, and said, You shall see what a 
lewd Fellow this is, and not fit to speak in this place: And then caused the 
said libellous Articles to be read in the publick Sessions; and the Plaintiff 
then desiring a Copy of them, and to be tryed upon them, the Witnesses to 
prove them being noted in the Margin, the Defendant did not suffer him to 
have a Copy, or to be tried thereupon, nor took any Course, that he might 
at the next Sessions, or at any time after, be questioned for them, but took 
the Articles again out of the Sessions, and carried them away; and after, 
farther to disgrace the Plaintiff in his Practice (being an Attorney) sent the 
said Articles to Mr. Justice Harvey, at the Reference of a Cause to him, 
which Caston attended . . . .  
 
(In what was apparently an unrelated matter, Hitchman had insulted a jury by calling 
them “a company of Fools,” after they had voted with his opponent in a legal case.) The 
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Star Chamber committed to Hitchman to the Fleet and levied a steep—but not crushing—
fine of 200 l. At the bottom of this summary, Rushworth includes the following note: “In 
this Cause the Defendant would have had Witnesses to prove the Matters of the said 
scandalous Articles to be true; but that was disallowed by the Court.” 100 The significance 
of this comment has already been addressed.  
The year 1631 was also one in which the Star Chamber moved to avenge two of 
its own regular members—the Earl of Danby and Lord Viscount Faulkland (or 
Falkland)—from harm caused by wagging tongues. But over the summer the court also 
dealt with a matter involving somewhat less exalted suitors. They had been engaged in a 
long legal battle with Defendants Crokey and Wright over possession of land in Glosester 
County. After losing a case in Chancery,  
the Defendant Crokey maliciously contrived and caused to be printed a 
great number of libellous Books, and many of them to be exhibited to the 
Lords and others then assembled in Parliament, and others, to be published 
in divers other places; and the Defendant Wright also published many of 
them . . . . 
 
Once again, however, this case might properly be considered along with the ‘contempt of 
court’ cases below, because although the Star Chamber determined that the “Book 
contained much Matter scandalous to the Plaintiff Smith,” it also impugned “the Courts 
of Justice, where their Suits had depended.” For this “malicious Libel,” both Defendants 
were imprisoned at the Fleet, the chief offender, Crokey, was fined 200 l. and Wright 100 
l. The Star Chamber also ordered its “Decree to be read at the Assizes to clear Smith's 
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Reputation, and Crokey then to acknowledge his Offence and ask him Forgiveness.” The 
books themselves were ordered “publickly burnt” at the Assizes—although not yet, as we 
learn from Prynne’s ordeal over Histriomastix, by the common hangman.101     
In yet another example of a case that I have chosen to discuss under the heading 
of ‘private libel’ but that could also be analyzed as a ‘contempt’ of authority case, in the 
fall of 1631 the Court of Star Chamber heard the case of a priest named Dalton involving 
“Libellous Words against a Minister.” Apparently Dalton had gotten crossways with 
some of his parishioners. One of the defendants, a woman named Eleanor Beck, “did 
falsisy, and did libellously publish, and give out Speeches at several times, and to several 
Persons that the Plaintiff had got her with Child, and falsly named the Time and Place 
when and where it should be done.” Her husband Richard was complicit, having 
originally vouched for the authenticity of the tale. After being called out, however, “they 
now both swear they believe the Plaintiff to be innocent of any such Crime.”102  
Dalton had other enemies, however. Another defendant, Heyton, “out of Malice to 
the Plaintiff, published and said, that the Plaintiff lived in Adultery with the Pedler's 
Wife; and that a Priest had gotten a Pedlar's Wife with Child, meaning the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant Eleanor Beck.” The Becks “were committed to the House of Correction, to 
be set at work three Months, and be well whipped, and fined 40 l. a-piece,” while Heyton 
was “committed and fined 100 Marks.” The Defendants were also ordered to ask the 
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Plaintiff’s forgiveness “in his Parish-Church, and at the Assizes where the Decree shall 
be read.” 103 
The following year, in the fall of 1632, the court snuffed out another private 
libel.104 The Defendants, Harrison and Spyer, “published an infamous Libel, which they 
called, ‘Verses made of the purer sort’, to the scandal and disgrace of the Plaintiffs.” The 
gist of the libel seems to have been the suggestion that the Plaintiff, Smith, had lain with 
Martha Osmonton (also a Plaintiff). Upon being hailed into court, “all the Defendants” 
repudiated the story and acknowledge the Plaintiffs “to have lived in good repute, and to 
be of honest Life and Conversation.” But apparently the ‘Verses’ were in high demand. 
Another Defendant, Tufton, had gotten hold of the ‘Verses’ and circulated them among 
the townsfolk of Rye, East Sussex. Another libeler, Martin, “said the Libel was true . . . 
and therefore it was not a Libel, but a True Bill.” Rushworth reports that the Defendants 
were “committed to the Fleet” and incurred fines ranging from 500 marks to 200 l. The 
Defendants were also required “to acknowledge their Offences, and great Injury done to 
the Plaintiffs, both at this Bar, and at Rye . . . and shew themselves heartily sorry for the 
same.” 105 
 Then, in the spring of 1633, the court heard the case of Henry Sherfield. His was 
not technically a ‘speech’ case, but it involved what might be called ‘expressive church-
window smashing’. I have chosen to address Sherfield’s case among the political speech 
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cases below, as it is one for which considerable evidence has been preserved and, perhaps 
more clearly than any other case, demonstrates the existence of political fault lines in the 
Court of Star Chamber (along, of course, a Puritan-Arminian divide). I mention 
Sherfield’s case here only to provide some context. Several important speech cases were 
also heard in Star Chamber in 1633, but Rushworth mentions only one that seems to 
qualify as the kind of ‘private libel’ case we have been examining in this section. That 
case was Webster v. Lucas. The Defendant, apparently an illiterate woman, under the 
pen-name Joan Tell-Troth (and later Tom Tell-Troth), “procured a libellous and scolding 
Letter to be written to the Plaintiff and then to be written over by a Scrivener's Boy, and 
sent him by a Porter . . . .” The letter, which soon made the rounds of the taverns and 
alehouses, seems not to have amounted to much more than juvenile name-calling: “in the 
Letter she often termed Scoggin, with other disgraceful Names, and the Plaintiff's 
Wife Jezebel, and the Daughter of Lucifer, with other invective Terms . . . .” And so, 
whatever Joan Tell-Troth’s motivation had been, she found herself committed by the 
High Court of Star Chamber, fined 40 l. (an amount probably higher than her annual 
income), and bound to her good behavior. As a female Defendant, Ms. Lucas was also 
sentenced “to be duck'd in a Cucking-Stool at Holborn-Dike . . . .” Although the fine 
seems heavy for an offense that did little harm beyond annoying the Plaintiffs (bear in 
mind that in 1626 John York, the knight’s son was only fined 50 l.), it nevertheless 
appears that in Webster the court was once again attempting to tailor the punishment to 
the crime. The social rank of the Webster Plaintiffs does not appear in the record, but this 
case also seems to demonstrate the seriousness with which the lords of Star Chamber 
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could intervene in even the pettiest squabbles in the realm.    
A last case from 1633, Stace v. Walker, although it is categorized under the 
heading, “Practice to defame,” is not really about libel but abuse of process. However, 
like Sherfield’s case, Stace may be helpful in assessing the relative severity of the 
sentences in the political cases decided at around the same time. Although the details are 
worth reading, the essence of the case is that Walker had deviously attempted to frame 
Stace with stealing his sheep (by killing several of them himself and nailing their skins to 
Stace’s trees). Walker then reported the ‘theft’ and Stace was tried—and, happily, 
acquitted. Except for the fine, Walker’s sentence was almost as severe as permissible in 
Star Chamber:   
for these Offences the Defendant was committed to the Fleet during Life, 
fined 1000 l. be set on the Pillory at Tenterden before the Plaintiff's Door, 
and at Canterbury at the Sessions, with a Paper on his Head declaring his 
Offence, and at each Place acknowledg his Offence, and have an Ear cut 
off; to be tied to the Tree where he hang'd the Wool a whole day, with the 
Wool about his Neck, be set in the Pillory at Maidstone with the like Paper 
on his head, and there acknowledg his Offence, and pay the Plaintiff five 
hundred Marks damage.106 
 
In Stace, we find Star Chamber judges once again finding creative ways to relate the 
punishment to the crime. The punishments inflicted seem designed, almost without 
exception, to achieve the maximum deterrent effect—to educate the inhabitants of 
England about the appropriate boundaries of public expression and to send a warning 
about what happens when those boundaries are transgressed. Although Walker’s sentence 
was severe (assuming it was carried out—and sentences were occasionally remitted), he 
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arguably escaped with less punishment than he deserved: Stace was tried for a crime he 
did not commit and would have been sentenced according to notions of justice at least as 
severe as those applied to Walker if he had been convicted. This sentence was meted out 
the year before William Prynne first arrived in the Star Chamber as a defendant (he had 
previously practiced there as an attorney). With Prynne’s sentence in mind by way of 
comparison, it is interesting note that nothing in the record suggests that anyone on the 
court had any particular vendetta against Walker. They just thought he had done 
something terribly wrong and exercised their authority to inflict the harsh remedy they 
believed his crime demanded.   
 The final ‘private libel’ case in Rushworth’s notes, Peyton v. Penny, was heard 
during the Easter term in 1634.107 Here we have another ‘Libellous Song’ being “passed 
from man to man.” The Plaintiff was not mentioned by name, but he “was generally 
conceived” to have been the intended victim. The original poet, and those who passed 
along the libel, “were committed to the Fleet, bound to their good Behaviour; fined 200 l. 
apiece,” and ordered to pay damages to the Plaintiff in the amount of 200 marks. As 
usual, the sentence included public shaming of the perpetrator: the court ordered 
Penny “to stand on a Stool in the Church-Porch on a Sunday, while the Parishoners are 
coming to Church with a Paper on his Head declaring his Offence,” and then, “after 
Service, and Sermon ended,” the Defendants were required “to ask the Plaintiff 
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forgiveness, and acknowledg their Offences.”108  
 The picture of the Court of Star Chamber that emerges from the preceding survey 
of private libel cases is a court engaged in the routine and impartial punishment of 
malicious speech—or at least ill-advised words. The court may have erred on the side of 
severity, but for the most part, as we have seen, the judges sought to impose sentences 
that were both just and proportionate. We also find a court wielding the didactic power of 
exemplary justice as it sought to police the boundaries of acceptable public discourse. 
This is the High Court of Star Chamber that emerges from the treatises of Edward Coke 
and William Hudson.  But there is another Star Chamber—the one decried by William 
Prynne, and the one that lives on in the popular imagination.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
STAR CHAMBER IN ACTION: 
PART II, ‘POLITICAL’ SPEECH CASES 
 
 
. . .it is needful that a remarkable example be layd upon  
the raysers of such and soe great a scandall.109 
 
— Sir Thomas Edmonds (1631) 
 
 
Although I have chosen to conceptualize the trials in this chapter as ‘political’, I 
want to emphasize that I am using that label broadly to talk about cases that involve any 
kind of speech about government officials or public affairs. The ‘contempt’ cases 
included here arguably belong to a category of their own; yet at the heart of every 
contempt proceeding is an effort to instill due reverence (or, to use the seventeenth-
century word, ‘fear’) for established authority through a calculated display of state power. 
England during the 1620s and 1630s was in the midst of a prerevolutionary moment, and 
it therefore makes sense to examine the period’s contempt proceedings for what they 
have to tell us about changing attitudes toward authority. It is always difficult, and often 
impossible, to know whether any given act of contempt was motivated purely out of 
particularized resentment of an individual magistrate or whether, instead, the act of 
contempt should be interpreted as a localized expression of a more generalized rage 
against established power structures. In the following discussion, we will attempt to 
understand the role played by the Court of Star Chamber in maintaining the status quo 
against the new spirit of rebelliousness that began to emerge in England in the 1620s and 
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1630s.110 
The first ‘political’ case in Rushworth’s notes was heard during Easter term of 
1627. One hint that we are dealing with a ‘political’ rather than ‘private’ case in Star 
Chamber is that ‘political’ cases were typically brought by the King’s Attorney in the 
form of an ‘information’ from the aggrieved party. Thus we have King’s Attorney 
rel[ator] Tho[mas] Whitache v. Moody & wife, involving a “scandal of the Court of 
Arches & Judge by libelous letters.”111 The facts that gave rise to this case are difficult to 
surmise, but apparently  Sir William Byrel, a judge of the Court of Arches, had granted to 
Moody’s nephew, a man named Adyn, “a Sequestration of the Body . . . and a Licence to 
marry” a young woman named Mary Rud. For some reason Moody did not appreciate 
this decision, “and thereupon . . . framed two libellous Letters, one in the name of his 
Wife, whereto she set her Hand after it was transcribed by a Servant.” The two letters, in 
which Moody committed scandal against the Court of Arches by calling it a “Lemman 
Court, where none but Lemmans and Knaves seek their Prey,” were “directed and sent” 
to Mary, the new Mrs. Adyn. Moody complained that the law applied in the Court of 
Arches was “cruel” and made other unspecified criticisms of the court. He also 
specifically impugned the reputation of the judge, Sir William Bird, along with “all 
others the Doctors and Proctors, and Officers of the Court, terming them Wolves that live 
by the rapine of innocent and harmless Virgins.” Moody expressed similar sentiments to 
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other people, and for this he was hauled in front of Star Chamber to answer for his 
contemptuous words. He and his wife were both, as usual, “committed to the Fleet,” and 
fined 200 l. and 100 l., respectively. The husband—the guiltiest party—was also ordered 
to appear before the bar in Star Chamber, “and in humble and submissive manner, under 
his hand, acknowledge his great Offence in falsly scandalizing both the said Court and 
Judge.”112 To the extent that the punishment in this case was elevated in comparison with 
the fines in the private cases reviewed above, the likely explanation is that the Defendant 
was guilty of defaming not just an individual officer of the court, but the entire court 
system.  
The same spring in which the Star Chamber punished Moody’s contempt of court, 
it decided the first overtly political case of our sample. This was King’s Attorney v. 
Perkins, brought ore tenus (upon a deemed confession) on charges of scandal against the 
king, his Privy Council, and his judges, and for ‘seditious’ opposition to “his Majesty’s 
services.”113 The backstory to this case is Charles’ ongoing fight with Parliament over 
funding the government and his military endeavors. In an effort to supply by force the 
revenues Parliament refused to grant, Charles had sent commissioners to Nottingham to 
collect ‘forced loan’ payments.  The Defendant, Perkins, had gone before them, littering 
the highway with “divers libellous scandalous and seditious Letters, both against the 
King and State.” These letters were addressed to the “Freeholders and true-
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hearted Englishmen” of Nottingham “with intent to dissuade all the Freeholders of the 
said County . . . from yielding to subscribe to the said Loans.” It was a rousing call to 
action. Parliament had not authorized the loan, Perkins argued, and therefore the king’s 
commissioners had no right to collect it. This unambiguous argument in support of the 
right to refuse what amounted to an extra-parliamentary tax became, in the eyes of the 
king’s attorney, an act of disloyalty. In publishing his views, Perkins had also “slandered 
his Majesty and Privy-Council with Injustice, Oppression and Cruelty” by alleging that 
the king and his council intended “to subvert the Power of Parliaments.” Perkins warned 
his neighbors that if they capitulated to royal pressure, “they should never see more 
Parliaments, but they and their Posterity should be Slaves forever.” Perkins also blamed 
the king’s judges, who were implicated in the crime against the English nation by 
rubberstamping the king’s lawlessness. In addition to publishing these opinions, Perkins 
informed his neighbors (truthfully) that neighboring counties had also refused the king—
clearly intending that Nottingham should follow their example. For this act of defiance, 
Perkins “was committed to the Fleet during the King's pleasure,” and fined a hefty 
3000 l. The Court of Star Chamber—comprised mainly of the king’s privy councilors—
was clearly choosing sides.  
A less exalted political fight played out in Star Chamber the following year—one 
involving a parsonage. The Defendant in King’s Attorney v. Mady stood accused of 
“Scandal of the High Commission Court” and its judges “by an Answer and Rejoinder in 
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the Court of Chancery.”114 The Defendant, a parson, had been “justly deprived by the 
Sentence of the High Commission Court” for some “irregularity” and ousted from the 
cure of the church at Blagden. He was replaced by a cleric named Parker—and the 
parsonage went with the job. Seven years later, Mady showed up at Parker’s door 
claiming that James I had issued a pardon reversing his deprivation and entitling him to 
recover the house. Parker found it necessary to sue Mady in the Court of Chancery, and 
Mady’s defense to the Chancery suit is what got him in trouble with Star Chamber. In his 
answer, Mady alleged that the High Commission’s sentence was illegal, unfounded, and 
procedurally flawed—the court had not even bothered to secure witnesses against him. 
Mady suggested that the real reason he had lost his post had nothing to do with his 
conduct as a minister. Instead, he had been pushed out of his benefice “that one of the 
Commissioners might have the bestowing thereof,” Parker being the presumed 
beneficiary of these machinations. For this scandal against High Commission, Mady 
“was committed to the Fleet, fined 200 l.,” and ordered “to acknowledge his Offence, and 
make his Submission to the High Commission Court.” Mady’s “Answer and Rejoinder” 
was so tainted that it was not to be preserved among the court records but “taken from the 
File and cancelled.” Finally, Mady was required to appear in the Court of Star Chamber 
to “publickly acknowledge his Sentence to be just.” Mady’s fine was small in comparison 
to Perkins’, but that does not necessarily mean that the court felt his offense less 
reprehensible. It should be recalled that the High Commission had already kicked Mady 
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out of his job—and his home—and apparently he had been unable to secure a new 
position. Why else would he have showed up to confront Parker after such an extended 
interval? Perkins’ was thus probably worth much more than Mady at the time of 
sentencing and thus incurred a higher fine.  
In the fall of 1628, Star Chamber decided King’s Attorney v. Heron and Banier, 
another ore tenus case arising out of events surrounding the assassination of the Duke of 
Buckingham in August.115 In Cambridgeshire during the previous Whitsuntide (and 
therefore well before the assassination), Defendant Heron made the acquaintance of 
Defendant Banier, confiding to him that he had killed the Duke. Instead of informing on 
Heron, Banier helped him conceal his identity—apparently he approved of the ‘crime’. 
After the assassination, Heron continued to inject himself into the narrative, accusing 
“divers Noblemen, and other Persons of good Rank and Quality” of having assisted 
Felton in Buckingham’s assassination. Banier escaped with his ears, but was “committed 
to the Fleet, fined 1000 l. and bound to his good behaviour during Life.” Heron, on the 
other hand, incurred the full wrath of Star Chamber. In addition to a life sentence and a 
fine double the size of Banier’s, Heron was  
to be whipt from the Fleet to Westminster, and be there set in the Pillory, 
with one of his Ears nailed and cut off, his Nostrils slit, his Face branded 
with the letter F in one Cheek, and the letter A in the other Cheek, for a 
false Accuser of himself and others: And at another time to be whipt from 
the Fleet to Charing-Cross, and be there set in the Pillory, with his other 
Ear nailed and cut off, and from thence be carried to Bridewell, there to be 
kept at work during life. 
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This punishment is in keeping with the one meted out in the ‘sheepskin’ case described 
above, and both cases share the common element of serious false allegations. It also 
demonstrates that mutilation as a punishment for serious crimes was still very much a 
part of English law.  
 The next three political speech cases preserved in Rushworth’s notes were heard 
during Easter term, 1629. We have already examined the case of Richard Chambers in 
the previous chapter, and keeping the outcome of that case in mind may add some color 
to the other two. One was King’s Attorney v. Maud, an ore tenus prosecution of a 
defendant charged with making speeches in which he “wickedly, undutifully, traiterously 
and seditiously” propagated a rumor “that the King went to Mass with the Queen.” When 
Maud was examined concerning the source of his information, he named several 
individuals “who, being examined, did deny it.” Although it imposed a crushing fine, the 
court went out of its way to point out that the sentence could have been much more 
terrible:  
The Court declared, that it was his Majesties great Grace, that the 
Defendant was not dealt withal in a higher degree; and therefore fined him 
5000 l. committed him to the Fleet; and ordered him to acknowledg his 
offence in this Court, with a Paper on his Head, declaring his offence, and 
to make the like acknowledgment at all the Bars of all the Courts 
at Westminster, and at the publick Assizes of Suffolk and Huntington, and 
at Pauls Cross, and the Preacher at that time to reprove the Raisers and 
Publishers of such notorious, false and slanderous Reports. 
 
Note, once again, the theatrical nature of the punishment. Star Chamber was sending a 
warning to others who might be similarly inclined to cast aspersions on the royal family.  
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The other political case that term was Lord Savile v. Viscount Wentworth—
although here we have a case that might have been included among the ‘private libels’ 
considered earlier, except that it involved a longstanding political rivalry. Savile’s bill, 
“containing mainy foul and odious Charges,” had been filed over three years earlier, but 
rather than pursuing the matter, Savile simply allowed his allegations to “hang as a 
Libel.” Both parties were probably well-known to the judges, but Wentworth currently 
enjoyed the favor of the king, whose help he had perhaps enlisted. In any event, Savile 
was “fined 100 l. to his Majesty, and ordered to pay to the Lord Wentworth,” along with 
100 l. to Lord Clifford and 50 l. each to the Lord Fairfax, Sir Richard Colmnley, and 
Sir Thomas Gower, Sir Edward Stanhop, and Mr. Jo. Ledgard.” Savile’s rank did not 
shield him from the customary punishment in such cases: he was ordered “to make an 
acknowledgment, in such manner publickly in this Court, or otherwise, as should be 
thought fit.” The court did extend an olive-branch to Savile, offering him a chance to re-
file his action—but only if he was sure he could win. And as in Maby’s case, in an act 
calculated to frustrate future historians, Savile’s “Bill was ordered to be taken from the 
File and cancelled.116 
By the time Richard Chambers, Maud, and Lord Savile were standing at the bar of 
Star Chamber in the spring of 1629, about 500 or 600 copies of a book by Dr. Alexander 
Leighton entitled An Appeale to the Parliament, or, Sions Plea Against the Prelacy, 
calling for the abolition of the episcopacy were already in circulation. In less than a year 
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Leighton would be languishing in Newgate prison awaiting his own fate in the Star 
Chamber. Rushworth’s account of Leighton’s case is not overly helpful—for example, he 
inexplicably refers to Leighton as being a Roman Catholic (though this was true of 
Leighton’s father). Fortunately, Rushworth’s account of this important case may be 
supplemented with details found in Cobbett’s State Trials. By information to the king’s 
attorney, Sir Robert Heath, Leighton was charged “with framing, publishing, and 
dispersing a scandalous book against King, Peers, and Prelates” full of “false and 
seditious assertions.”117 The information catalogued a long list of offenses: England was 
the world’s greatest persecutor of God’s People, “especially since the death of queen 
Elizabeth”; English prelates were “Men of Blood, and Enemies to God and the State” and 
should not have a voice in secular government; the Anglican prelacy was “Antichristian 
and Satanical,” and it ceremonies and cannons were ridiculous; England suffered under 
the government of a ‘tractable’ king whose judgment had been corrupted by ‘prelates’; 
and he had married a “daughter of Heth” (i.e., a Roman Catholic).  
More seriously, Leighton rehearsed the embarrassing details of Buckingham’s 
blunder at La Rochelle and seemed to commend his assassination. Leighton also ventured 
into the dangerous argument that had ended the life of more than one bishop, questioning 
the king’s authority to make laws and canons for the government of the church. The 
church received its laws from the scripture, and “no king may make laws in the ‘house of 
God’”. Although Leighton was too sick to appear at trial (his wife attended in his stead), 
the result was a foregone conclusion: in his Answer, Leighton had confessed writing the 
                                                          
117 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 383-384. 
 72 
Book, and the rest was, to borrow a common law phrase, res ipsa loquitur.118 
 The Star Chamber was duly apoplectic. “[T]heir lordships by an unanimous 
consent” agreed to a barbarous punishment. Leighton was “committed to the Fleet during 
Life, unless the King enlarge him,” subjected to a crushing fine of 10000 l., referred to 
High Commission “to be degraded of his Ministry.” So far, this is punishment is more or 
less in keeping with other Star Chamber decisions, but in this case the court went much 
further: Leighton was “then to be whipped at the Pillory at Westminster, and standing on 
the Pillory to lose one of his Ears, his Nose slit, and his Face branded with a double ‘S’” 
for ‘sower of sedition’ and then “in like sort to be whipped and lose his other Ear at the 
Pillory in Cheapside. Possibly owing to a delay in carrying out the sentence occasioned 
by an outbreak of plague in London, the sources suggest that the second half of sentence 
was remitted.119 
 Leighton’s case is full of interesting features, including his failed escape and his 
refusal to doff his hat during his appearance before High Commission. But for present 
purposes, perhaps the most interesting detail is the attitude of the two chief justices 
toward Leighton. In sentencing Richard Chambers the previous year, both Sir Thomas 
Richardson, Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and Sir Nicholas Hyde, Lord Chief 
Justice of the King's-Bench, had displayed an obvious inclination toward leniency voting 
with Lord Cottington for the lightest feasible sentence. In sentencing Leighton, however, 
they “delivered their opinions, that they would without any scruple have proceeded 
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against the defendant as for treason committed by him, if it had come before them.” This 
was apparently the sense of the whole court. Cobbett reports that the “other lords 
expressly affirmed, that it was his majesty's exceeding great mercy and goodness, that he 
was brought to receive the censure of this court, and not questioned at another tribunal as 
a traitor.120 What the lords left unsaid is that in the charged environment of the early 
1630s Attorney-General Heath might have encountered difficulty securing a common-
law indictment. In other words, it may be that Leighton was before Star Chamber not as 
an act of mercy, but out of necessity.  
The royal couple and Anglican bishops were not the only ones who required the 
protection of Star Chamber in 1630. That fall, the court heard King’s Attorney v. Norton, 
et al., involving a scandal of Lord Keeper Coventry. Lord Coventry had acted as a judge 
in Chancery in a case to which Defendant Bonham Norton was a party. The official 
version of the facts is that Norton attempted to bribe Coventry to secure a favorable 
outcome. When Coventry not only refused the bribe but also—predictably—ruled against 
Norton. Angered by this outcome, Norton—again predictably—complained that he had 
not been treated fairly in court. Norton sought to exact revenge by “Writing divers false 
and feigned Notes,” claiming to have learned from the Defendants Lee and May that 
Coventry had accepted “the Sum of 600 l. and of other several great Sums of Money . . . 
for Favour to be done.” Norton “traduced the Lord Keeper,” calling him “the Unjust 
Judge.” However, what probably ensured Norton and his hired associates a date at the bar 
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of Star Chamber was their delivery of “a False and Scandalous Petition to his Majesty 
against the Lord Keeper.”  
For these “foul Scandals and Aspersions,” Norton was fined 3000 l., and was 
ordered “to acknowledge at the Chancery-Bar, with a Paper on his Head declaring his 
offence, that the Decree of that Court betwixt him and Barker was just and agreeable to 
the Rules of Equity, and a good Conscience.” He was also directed to make a humble 
acknowledgement of “and ask his Majesty and the Lord Keeper forgiveness.” The ritual 
of begging pardon was to be repeated in the Star Chamber and at the Salop Assizes.  
Norton’s ‘agents’, Lee and May, were jailed, fined 1000 l. apiece, and sentenced 
“to ride to Westminster from the Fleet with their Faces to the Horse-tail.” Lest we are 
tempted to dwell too much upon the humor of this punishment, as usual, there was more 
to come. In addition to making public acknowledgment and asking forgiveness, the 
defendants were  
then be set on the Pillory with one Ear nailed to it, while the Courts fit; 
and another day to ride into Cheapside in such manner as before, and be 
there set on the Pillory, with their other Ear nailed, and be carried to 
Prison, there to remain during Life.121  
 
The message was unmistakable. 
 
 Norton was not the only disappointed Chancery litigant to appear before the Star 
Chamber during the 1630 Michaelmas term. In King’s Attorney v. Jones, the Defendant 
had “contrived a libellous Writing in the nature of a Petition,” suggesting that the judge, 
Sir Euble Thelwall, “had made a false Report in his Cause.” Jones suggested that 
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Thelwall’s decision was the product of a conflict of interest. Jones was “committed to 
the Fleet,” fined 200 l., and ordered to acknowledge his offence in public. (No damages 
were awarded to Sir Euble, “because he died before the Sentence.”122 
A few months later, Star Chamber dealt with another contempt matter, King’s 
Attorney v. Morgan, but in this case the Defendant actually had a basis for feeling himself 
wronged. Morgan was a Catholic and had been accused by two local justices of being a 
“popish priest.” After Morgan refused to take the Oath of Allegiance, “he was indicted 
and attainted . . . and committed to Gaol.” Sometime later, Morgan “wrote a libellous and 
scandalous Letter to the said Justices,” complaining of his treatment. He had also written 
a bit of ‘fake news’ in which he “traiterously alledged his Majesty to be deposed, the 
Authority of his Privy Council abrogated, the Bishop of Chalcedon made King, the 
Inhabitants of Flintshire his Slaves.” Morgan was imprisoned for life, fined 1000 marks, 
and ordered to stand in the pillory at Westminster, and again at the Flintshire Assizes, 
“with one Ear nailed at each Place.” He was also directed to “shew himself heartily sorry 
and penitent.” 123 
Easter term 1631 included yet another colorful ‘libel of a justice’ case, Moor v. 
Norris, but as it also involved an assault, let us pass on to consider a more important (and 
even more colorful) case from that term King’s Attorney v. Ewer for slander of the Earl of 
                                                          
122 Rushworth, "Star Chamber Reports: 6 Charles I," 28-34. BHO, http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/rushworth-papers/vol3/pp28-34. 
123 Rushworth, "Star Chamber Reports: 6 Charles I," 28-34. BHO.  
 76 
Danby (like Coventry, himself a regular judge in Star Chamber). The facts speak for 
themselves: 
The Defendant at several times, in several places, and to several persons, 
did, in scorn, disgrace, and contempt of the Earl of Danby, use these 
Words: My Lord of Danby, my Lord of Danturd; he is a base cheating 
Lord, and a cozening Lord, and a base Fellow, and I care not so much for 
him as I do for a Fart of my Arse, I am a better Mass than he: He hath 
cozened the Country People in taking away their Common, so as he hath 
daily the Curses of thousands. 
 
For this bit of scatological indiscretion, Ewer “was committed to the Fleet during his 
Majesty's Pleasure, bound to his good Behaviour during Life, fined 1000 l. pay 1000 l. 
damage, and at the Bar of this Court, and at the Assizes at Oxon, to acknowledge his 
Offence, and ask the said Earl Forgiveness.” It is worth noting that Ewer was an 
armiger, which might have served to lessen his offense to some extent. On the other 
hand, the expectation that the ‘better sort’ should comport themselves with 
circumspection can be clearly seen in Falkland’s case (discussed in the preceding 
chapter) which was heard during the same term of court.   
Ewer’s case should be compared with the 1634 case of Kingston v. Pettinger, in 
which the Defendant, in front of a crowd at Barnsley in Yorkshire, insulted the Earl 
of Kingston by calling him “a Base Lord; a T— in his Teeth; he is but Cur, and a Base 
Lord, and of no account.” Although I’m not sure what a T— is (and will not hazard a 
guess!), Pettinger’s remarks seem less “contemptuous, scandalous, and disgraceful” than 
those of Ewer. Yet Pettinger was “committed to the Fleet; fined 200 l. to pay 2000 l. 
damage to the Plaintiff, at Nottingham Assizes to be publickly whipped, and before his 
Enlargement out of the Fleet, to find Sureties for his good Behaviour.” Perhaps there 
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were aggravating factors in Pettinger’s case that do not appear in the record, but I find it 
mysterious that two such similar cases could result in such different outcomes.  
We will also pass over the 1632 case of Kilbert v. Hanger, except to note that it 
involved libel of an arbitrator by yet another disgruntled litigant followed by a large fine 
and a stint in prison.124 Instead, as we have already considered the 1633 case of Sherfield 
(the ‘Salisbury Smasher’), we round out our sample with three other cases heard in the 
Star Chamber in 1633, King’s Attorney v. Reignolds, King’s Attorney v. Bowyer, and 
King’s Attorney v. Fowlis. All three of these cases underscore what I have been arguing 
was one of the core functions of the Court of Star Chamber: to defend the established 
power structures of Church and State.   
 The first case, heard in Trinity term, was King’s Attorney v. Reignolds arising out 
of a ‘scandal’ of John Bridgeman, Bishop of Chester from 1618 until his death in 1652. 
Although the background is not entirely clear from Rushworth’s account, this case may 
have arisen out of Bridgeman’s longstanding quarrel with Manchester minister Thomas 
Padget and other Puritans. In the 1620s, Bridgeman had Padget brought before the Court 
of High Commission over Padget’s resistance to kneeling at the communion table. Padget 
and other ministers had been fined, and the fines continued to compound. In 1631, efforts 
had been made to attach Padget’s property in order to collect the fine.125  
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In any event, it was not Padget, but a man named Reignolds who was at the bar of 
Star Chamber in 1633. He was accused of writing a “witless, malicious and libellous 
Letter” to a Proctor and a Consistory Clerk at York, alleging that Bishop Bridgeman “is 
so strong that if Bribery will be taken, you must lie all along, for the Bishop sh*ts 
Warrants at every Door . . . .” Predictably, “the Defendant was committed to the Fleet, 
fined 500 l.,” and ordered to be  
set on the Pillory at Wigan, Lancaster-Assizes, at the City of Chester, with 
a Paper on his Head, inscribed with Words declaring the nature of his 
Offence, and at each place publickly and penitently acknowledge his 
Offence and Scandal of the Bishop in such manner as it should be penn'd, 
and deliver'd to him.126 
 
 In the fall, Star Chamber heard another matter involving one of its own—this time 
William Laud, who in August had left his post as Bishop of London to succeed George 
Abbot as Archbishop of Canterbury.  The Defendant in King’s Attorney v. Bowyer was 
accused of “scandal of the State,” and “especially of the Archbishop” for making 
spreading a tale in Reading, that Laud had been “confin'd to Fulham-House” for high 
treason, with a watch of twelve guards to guard him.127 The grounds for Laud’s ‘treason 
arrest’ were that he was an Arminian who had corresponded with the Pope and several 
cardinals with offers of help (and promising a willing ear in the Queen and financial 
support from his own purse), that he had claimed “the Midwife of the Virgin Mary was a 
Mediatrix to our Saviour,” and that he had denied the Virgin’s humanity.128  Apparently 
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the occasion for the libel was a sermon Laud had “preached a Sermon before the King in 
Scotland, that was fit to be preached before the Pope.”  
In one of Star Chamber’s most brutal punishments, Bowyer was “committed to 
Bridewell, there to be kept at Work, during his Life, and never suffered to go abroad.” He 
was also to be fined 3000 l., and be  
set in the Pillory at Westminster, a Paper on his head declaring his 
offence, and there acknowledge, and confess the same; be set in the Pillory 
in Cheapside, with the like Paper, and there make the like submission and 
acknowledgment, and be burn'd in the Forehead with the Letters l. and R. 
and be set in the Pillory at Reading, with the like Paper, and both his Ears 
nailed thereto, and make the like submission and acknowledgment as 
before. 
 
As in the case of Norton and his associates for the slander of Lord Coventry in 1630, the 
lords of Star Chamber were again leveraging the full weight of their authority to crush 
anyone with the temerity to meddle with the great men of the realm. The slander of Laud 
was not a ‘private libel’ but a “slander of State” and therefore the moral equivalent of 
treason.  
 The final case in our sample, King’s Attorney v. Fowlis, et al., involved slander of 
Viscount Thomas Wentworth, upon whom Charles conferred the presidency of the 
Council of the North.129 Wentworth was also commissioned to collect the fines assessed 
against all those who failed to show up at Charles’s coronation to take the Order of 
Knighthood “as they should have done.” Knighthood fines were one of the many 
improvisations to which Charles had resorted since dismissing his last Parliament, and Sir 
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David Fowlis had engaged in an act of resistance similar to the one for which Richard 
Chambers was still languishing in prison for refusing to pay illegal tonnage on a shipment 
of silk. The Defendant was a member of the Council of the North who had called together 
his neighbors to organize opposition to the knighthood fines, urging what could be called 
civil disobedience. He also accused his neighbors of cowardice in the face of tyranny, 
reminding them  
That Yorkshire Gentlemen in times past had been accounted stout-spirited 
Men, and would have stood for their Rights and Liberties, and were wont 
to be the worthiest of all other Shires . . . . 
But now, instead of coming to the aid of other shires, the men of Yorkshire had 
“become degenerate, more dastardly and more cowardly than the Men of other Counties.” 
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire were assessed lower fines, but even they had “utterly 
refused to compound,” solely on principle. Fowlis suggested that his neighbors had been 
bewitched by Wentworth, although “at Court he was no more respected than an ordinary 
man . . . .” This alone might have been enough to get Fowlis a date with Star Chamber, 
but he went on to accuse Wentworth of pocketing the revenue he collected, suggesting 
that Yorkshire would have to pay up again as a result.   
This case is clearly one in which contempt of court was also at issue. As a 
member of the Council of the North, Sir David had sworn “to maintain and uphold the 
Honour, and Liberties thereof to his uttermost.” Instead, he had demonstrated “scorn and 
contempt of that Court,” calling it a “Paper Court,” subservient to the justices of the 
peace, and without authority to summon the county’s high sheriff.  Had Sir David been 
the sheriff in question, “he would not care a Dogs Turd” for the Council.  
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At 5000 l., Fowlis’s fine was considerable, but not necessarily crippling for 
someone of his influence. He was also ordered to pay 3000 l. to Wentworth as damages, 
“committed to the Fleet during the King's pleasure,” and directed “to acknowledge his 
offences in this Court, before the Council at York, and at the Assizes at York . . . .” 
Notably, however, Fowlis retained his ears and was not even required to stand in the 
pillory. Sir David’s social station almost certainly saved him from corporal punishment.   
 
 Although I have characterized the cases in this chapter as involving some form of 
‘political speech’, most of these cases, it turns out, are still actually about libel. That is to 
say, they are not secretly about something other than libel; there is no discernible ulterior 
motive at work in them. Instead, we find false and malicious words being uttered with an 
intent to injure, followed by a reckoning at the bar of the Court of Star Chamber, in the 
presence of the most august gathering of lords and judges in the realm. In the ‘private 
libel’ cases we examined in the preceding chapter, the punishments inflicted seem 
generally commensurate with the ‘crime’ and reasonably calculated to restore the 
reputation of the injured party, while at the same time serving as a warning to others who 
might be inclined toward similar mischief. This generally holds true for the ‘political 
speech’ cases, with this difference: speech directed against the great and powerful was 
regarded as an attack on the social order itself, and in such cases, the judges of the Court 
of Star Chamber were sometimes willing to sacrifice the strict demands of justice on the 
altar of the status quo.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FALL OF STAR CHAMBER 
 
  
And the stars of heaven fell unto the earth,  
even as a fig tree casteth her untimely figs,  
when she is shaken of a mighty wind. 
 
— Rev. 6:13 KJV 
 
 
On June 30, 1637, hunched in the pillory in the palace yard at Westminster 
alongside John Bastwick and Henry Burton, William Prynne proclaimed to the throng of 
mostly supportive onlookers gathered to witness the spectacle, “This is the second time 
that I have been brought to this Place, who hath been the Author of it, I think you all well 
know.130 Prynne referred, of course, to William Laud, the prolix Archbishop of 
Canterbury, who sat as a member of the Court of Star Chamber in both of Prynne’s libel 
trials, first for Histriomastix in 1634, and now again in 1637 for publishing “schismatical 
and libelous books against the Hierarchy.”131 Each of the sentences against Prynne had 
been unanimous, but this fact did not lessen Prynne’s conviction that the archbishop’s 
malevolent spirit exerted a powerful influence over the court. Laud’s habit of entering 
into long, learned disquisitions from the bench did nothing to diminish this impression. 
Prynne, however, could lecture too. From the pillory, possibly with blood dripping from 
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131 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 712. 
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the side of his head, Prynne explained the law applicable to his case:  
You shall find in case of libel, two statutes: the one in the second of queen 
Mary, the other in the seventh of queen Elizabeth. That in the second of 
queen Mary, the extremity and height of it runs thus, That if a Libeller doth 
go, so far and so high as to libel against king or queen by denomination, the 
height and extremity of the law is, that they lay no greater fine on him than 
an hundred pounds, with a month's imprisonment, and no corporal 
punishment, except he doth refuse to pay his fine; and then to inflict some 
punishment in lieu of that fine at the month's end.132 
 
And yet, here he was adding new bloodstains to the pillory.133 Prynne’s message to the 
crowd was clear: the Court of Star Chamber was a lawless institution. Four years later, as 
we have seen, this characterization of the court would be so widely accepted that it was 
written into the text of the law abolishing the Court of Star Chamber (minus the reference 
to William Laud, who by the time the law was enacted was already under arrest and 
awaiting trial for treason). Yet Prynne’s accusation does not comfortably align with the 
impression of the Court of Star Chamber that emerges from the foregoing study. William 
Laud certainly had allies on the court, especially in the persons of Thomas Wentworth 
and his fellow archbishop, Richard Neile. Moreover, as Lori Anne Ferrell has 
demonstrated, Archbishop Laud was unquestionably an intelligent man and a clever 
                                                          
132  Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, 747. 
133  Prynne was quoting from 1 &  2 Phil. & Mar. c. 3, which provided that “every suche person 
. . . being therof convicted or attainted in fourme hereafter in this Acte expressed, shall for every 
suche Offence in some Markett Place within the Shire Citie Boroughe or Towne . . . bee set 
openly upon the Pylorye . . . and ther to have one of his eares cut of, onles he paye One hundrethe 
Markes to the Kinge and Quenes Highnes use, within one monethe next after jugement gyven of 
his said Offence, and also shall suffer Imprisonement by the space of one monethe after his . . . 
Execution.” Available at 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915519;view=1up;seq=332;size=125 
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politician.134 We know, for example, that Laud effectively coordinated Star Chamber 
proceedings against enemies like Bishop John Williams.135 We even know that when a 
Commons committee was appointed to assess Prynne’s claims, it determined “that Laud 
was personally involved.”136 We must therefore be willing to accept the possibility that 
there is at least an element of truth in Prynne’s accusations. 
Laud himself quite naturally pushed back against the allegations during his 1644 
trial for high treason before Parliament.137 One of the many articles of impeachment 
presented against Laud involved a Star Chamber decree regulating the soap trade that had 
angered many manufacturers. As for these “Soap-boilers,” Laud protested, “they have 
little cause to be so vehement against me. For if the Sentence passed against them in the 
Star-Chamber were in anything illegal, tho it were done by that Court, and not by me.”138  
Later in his treason trial, Laud derisively recorded in his diary the presentation of the 
“great Charge (as at present it is accounted) concerning the Censure of Mr. Pryn, and 
Burton, and Bastwick, in the Star Chamber . . . .” According to Laud’s parliamentary 
prosecutors, the censure of the three authors was “known and urged to be against Law.” 
                                                          
134 Lori Anne Ferrell, “Preaching and English Parliaments in the 1620s.” Parliamentary History 
34, no. 1 (2015): 142-154. 
135 Williams, John (1582-1650) in DNB. 
136 Nicholas Robert Charles Forward, The Arrest and Trial of Archbishop William Laud. 
Unpublished master’s thesis (University of Birmingham, March 2012), 27-28. Available at 
http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/3660/2/Forward_12_MPhil.pdf 
137 Laud was well-acquainted with the outcome of Thomas Wentworth’s treason trial in 1641 
and probably had few illusions about his own fate.  
138 A Complete Collection of State-trials, and Proceedings for High-treason, and Other Crimes 
and Misdemeanours, From the Reign of King Richard II. to the End of the Reign of King George 
I. With Two Alphabetical Tables to the Whole, 827. Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, pt. 1, 240.  
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One aspect of the prosecution’s case involved warrants issued to bar access to the 
prisoners (apparently while they awaited trial). But Laud maintained his innocence: 
“These were Acts of the Lords sitting in Star-Chamber, not mine.” 
On the same day of the treason trial, “Mr. Pryn himself in his own Cause” had 
risen to condemn Laud. No doubt Prynne relished the opportunity to present his version 
of the facts to a packed House of Lords with Laud a captive in the center of the room. 
Laud described Prynne’s speech as “full of bitterness,” designed to portray the disgraced 
archbishop “as odious as he could to the Lords and the Hearers.” But Laud refused to 
shoulder the blame alone:  
I shall assume nothing to myself, that was done by Order of the Court of 
Star-Chamber: Whatsoever was done there by common Consent, was their 
Act, not mine; and if any Treason be in it, they are as guilty as I; for 
Treason admits no Accessaries.139 
 
Laud was also accused of refusing to allow Bastwick and Burton to submit a joint answer 
during their Star Chamber trial. But this was a procedural detail for which Laud, yet 
again, claimed no responsibility: “All this was done by the Court of Star-Chamber, not by 
me. And your Lordships know well the Lord Keeper managed the Affairs of that Court, 
not I.”140 (It is fruitless—but fascinating—to speculate as to whether Coventry would 
have faced a similar prosecution had he not conveniently died in 1640.)  
  
Given what we have learned about the personnel and institutional practices of the 
Court of Star Chamber throughout the preceding study, there is reason to believe Laud’s 
                                                          
139 A Complete Collection of State-trials, 835-836. 
140 A Complete Collection of State-trials, 836. 
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blame-shifting was not entirely self-serving and that he did not exercise exclusive control 
over the court’s behavior. But if Laud’s claims were more or less true—if his was only, 
as our study suggests, one voice out of many—we must then conclude that in 
prosecuting—and in 1645 executing—the Archbishop of Canterbury for high treason, the 
Long Parliament was, in effect, passing judgment on the acts of the Court of Star 
Chamber itself. Here we risk circling back to the debate over the court’s constitutional 
legitimacy that we have sought to avoid, but instead of competing the circuit, I would like 
to suggest an alternative interpretation of the fall of Star Chamber that has less to do with 
constitutional law and high politics more to do with the changing nature of English 
society in the seventeenth century.      
As late as the reign of James I, the Court of Star Chamber was held in such 
general respect that it was often invoked as a metaphor for divine justice. The 
Buckinghamshire vicar Thomas Adams, for example, was particularly fond of the 
analogy. In 1615, Adams dedicated a work to his patron, Sir Thomas Egerton, the Lord 
High Chancellor of England, with the assurance that the “unerring hand of God” had 
placed the Chancellor “in the Seate of Justice, and Chaire of Honour.” The whole realm 
was blessed to have Lord Egerton “sitting as a Star in the Star-Chamber.”141 For Adams, 
the temporal Court of Star Chamber was a minister of justice to offenders, but the product 
of the court’s activities was “Mercy to the Commonwealth.”  
Adams also found in the ‘Star Chamber’ a useful spiritual metaphor, drawing a 
                                                          
141 Thomas Adams, Mystical bedlam, or the world of mad-men (London: George Purslowe, 
1615). 
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clear analogy between the earthly court and its heavenly counterpart. Just as there was no 
appeal from the court that sat in the Camera Stellata at Westminster,  neither was there 
an appeal from the court of heaven at the last judgment.142 Adams continued to employ 
the ‘Star Chamber’ analogy as late as 1633 in his commentary on the Second Epistle of 
Peter. Adams reminded his readers that death will one day “serve a Subpoena . . . from 
the Starre-chamber of Heaven,”143 and earlier in the same commentary Adams wrote that 
“Satan no sooner spies our wandrings, but he presently [illeg.]nnes with a complaint to 
God, bills against us in the star-chamber of heaven; here the matter would goe hard with 
us, but for the great Lord Chancelour of peace, our Advocate Iesus Christ.”144 And in 
language which suggests that Adams possessed a degree of familiarity with the actual 
procedures of the temporal Court of Star Chamber (and perhaps also a sense of humor), 
he wrote, 
Now men deale with our Sermons, as they doe with our Tithes: when wee 
preach Judgement, they sue out a Prohibition from an higher Court, or a 
Protection from the Chancery, their Mercie-seat, or a Commission for 
Composition: but whither will they appeale from this Court, the great Star-
chamber of Heaven? 145 
 
In making these analogies, Adams obviously intended a favorable comparison between 
the two courts, human and divine.   
                                                          
142 See, e.g., Thomas Adams, The Happiness of the Church […] (London: John Grismand, 
1619), 40. EEBO. “The rich man is brought in upon a Premunire, can his gold acquit him in this 
Starre-chamber?”   
143 Thomas Adams, A commentary or, exposition upon the divine second epistle generall, 
written by the blessed apostle St. Peter. (London: Richard Badger, 1633), 1270. EEBO.  
144 Adams, A commentary or, exposition, 529.   
145 Adams,  A commentary or, exposition, 1241.  
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Adams was only one of many writers who found something noble or inspiring 
about the Court of Star Chamber. But by the 1640s, the ‘meaning’ of the Court of Star 
Chamber in the popular imagination had been completely transformed. A radically 
different set of analogies emerged in place of the type found in Adams’ writing. A few 
examples will suffice. In 1643, a royalist pamphlet by Yeldard Alvey puts the following 
rhetorical question into the mouth of a debater he calls Irenaeus:  
What hath the King denyed which concernes our Liberties, and are the 
undoubted securityes of our safety, freedome, and happinesse under the 
Regiment of a just and unquestionable Monarchy? Are not our Rights and 
Propertyes already established . . . are not . . . those arbitrary Courts of 
Justice, High Commission, Star-Chamber, Marshalseyes, &
. [...]erly [...]m 'd and extirpated . . . ? 146 
 
In 1645, an anonymous piece of Parliamentary propaganda appeared in defense of 
an ordinance prohibiting certain individuals from preaching without being ordained. 
Apparently the law provoked worries that Parliament was claiming the mantle of William 
Laud. Answering the charge that the new law would give advantage to “persecuting 
sprits,” the author asked:  
would not this be an an establishing of Tyranny by Law, and 
incouragement for oppression? a justifying of what is already more then 
once condemned by this present Parliament? Were not the Courts of Star-
chamber and High Commission therefore abolished by an Act, because the 
just Liberty of the Subject, not only in his estate and person, but also in the 
tendernesse of his conscience, and the innocency of his practice, in wayes 
of godlinesse, was so much struck at by them?147  
 
                                                          
146 Yeldard Alvey, A vulgar or popvlar discourse  […] (York: Stephen B., 1643), 16. EEBO. 
The illegible word could be ‘damned’, ‘condemned, etc.  
147 Anon. The cleere sense: or, A just vindication of the late ordinance of Parliament […] 
(London: M. Simmons, 1645), 8-9. EEBO.  
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The days of Star Chamber were over, the writer proclaimed, and it was preposterous to 
accuse Parliament of wanting to replace one kind of tyranny with another:  
can it be now rationally imagined, that the Parliament of England, who 
with the rest of the Kingdome in those Star-chamber and high 
Commission dayes, so sorely smarted under Prelaticall pride and power, 
should now voluntarily inslave the whole body of the nation . . . under 
bondage and misery, far worse then the former . . . ?148  
 
And yet this is exactly the accusation leveled by a group of London aldermen in a petition 
presented to the House of Lords in 1648.149 The impetus behind the petition was the 
impeachment of several members of their group who had refused to submit themselves 
on the grounds that a submission would “betray the common law,” and in so doing 
become instrumental in pulling “down al the Judicatories of the Kingdom,” in order to 
“re-edifie an Arbitrary Government many stories higher then ever the Star Chamber, 
High Commission or Councel Table were . . . .”150 
 
 What occasioned this dramatic shift in tone? In conclusion, I would like to 
suggest that, despite the regularity with which the Court of Star Chamber was condemned 
in contemporary literature for its ‘arbitrary’ decisions, what we are actually witnessing is 
a shift in English society’s view of authority. Or to put it more directly, we are seeing the 
                                                          
148 Anon. The cleere sense, 8-9.  
149 Thomas Adams, et al. To the right honorable the Lords assembled in PARLIAMENT. The 
humble Petition of Thomas Adams, John Langham, James Bunce Aldermen of London. London: 
1648), 5. EEBO. (This Adams is apparently not the same individual who authored the 
commentary on Second Peter—that would be a little too convenient!) 
150 Adams, et al. To the right honorable the Lords assembled in PARLIAMENT. The humble 
Petition of Thomas Adams, John Langham, James Bunce Aldermen of London. London: 1648), 5. 
EEBO. 
 90 
birth of a revolution.  
 As we saw in the case of Richard Chambers, a tide of dissonant opinion began to 
emerge in reaction to Charles I’s refusal to allow his first three Parliaments to participate 
in shaping public policy. The resentments of merchants like Chambers who found 
themselves in prison for expressing what must have been a widely-held political opinion 
did not dissipate during the years of Charles’ personal rule; instead, they continued to 
accumulate along with the grievances of other groups who felt themselves oppressed. 
Chief among these were the Puritans, who found themselves losing ground in the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, even as they watched the rise of a creeping Arminianism in the 
Church of England. Henry Sherfield may stand in for many others here. During the 
1630s, even moderate Puritans like Richard Baxter and centrists like George Abbot 
(Laud’s immediate predecessor as Archbishop of Canterbury), found themselves pushed 
to the margins as control of the episcopacy shifted to their Laudian opponents. 
Simultaneously, Arminian censors began to restrict access to the authorized channels of 
publication, forcing Puritan authors into the underworld of clandestine publishing.151 
Perhaps as a consequence, Puritan authors began writing with a greater sense of urgency, 
in the process resorting to more inflammatory and intemperate language. Alexander 
Leighton and William Prynne are the most obvious examples of this trend. The 
increasingly strident Puritan rhetoric, especially in its anti-episcopal iterations, smacked 
                                                          
151 See, e.g., David R. Como, “Print, Censorship, and Ideological Escalation in the English Civil 
War,” Journal of British Studies 51 (October 2012): 820-857; and, by the same author, “Secret 
Printing, the Crisis of 1640, and the Origins of Civil War Radicalism,” Past & Present 196 (Aug. 
2007): 37-82. 
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of sedition to conservative ears—especially to those of William Laud and Richard Neile, 
who sat at the top of the episcopal hierarchy (and who also sat as judges in the Court of 
Star Chamber). During William Prynne’s Star Chamber trial in 1634, Judge Richardson, 
who seems to have held moderate views in matters of religion, nevertheless took great 
offense when Prynne’s ostensibly pious rhetoric shaded into criticism of the king (and the 
queen). Richardson declared,  
Now if this be so, then for any man cunningly to undermine these things, 
to take away the hearts of the subjects from the king, and to bring the king 
into an ill opinion among his people, this is a most damned offence; and if 
I were in my proper place, and Mr. Prynn brought before me, I should go 
another way to work. I protest unto your lordships, it maketh my heart to 
swell, and my blood in my veins to boil, so cold as I am, to see this or any 
thing attempted which may endanger my gracious sovereign: it is to me 
the greatest comfort in this world to behold his prosperity.152 
 
From the preceding study, it seems abundantly clear that when Judge Richardson 
spoke, he expressed the sentiment of every judge of the Court of Star Chamber. In 
seeming to touch the king, Prynne had disturbed what Charles himself had once called 
the “circle of Order”153—the thing that the judges of Star Chamber valued, perhaps, 
above all else. In this regard, let us close with the words of another Star Chamber judge, 
                                                          
152 Howell, ed., Cobbett’s State Trials, vol. 3, 579. 
153 Larkin, James F., ed. Stuart Royal Proclamations, vol. II. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983), 93.  The concept of a “circle of order” may have been in general circulation. 
Elizabethan Privy Councilor Thomas Heneage used the expression in a 1586 letter from 
Utrecht to Lord Burlegh: “the very moving of an alteration of the present course of 
government (whereby the people's complaints and cries be heard and satisfied, the soldiers 
ruled and disposed, the officers and ministers of all the finances and contributions called to 
account and limited, and all the scattered and broken course of things reduced into one circle 
of order) will remove them from ever bowing to the yoke of true reformation again.” “April 
1586, 6-10,” in Sophie Crawford Lomas, ed., Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth, 
vol. 20, September 1585-May 1586, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921), 523-
540. BHO, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/foreign/vol20/pp523-540. 
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Thomas Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford, who like William Laud would lose his head in 
the coming revolution, who declared, “The authority of a King is the keystone which 
closeth up the arch of order and government . . . .” Once shaken, Wentworth warned, “all 
the frame falls together in a confused heap . . . .”154 
                                                          
154 C.V. Wedgewood, Thomas Wentworth: First Earl of Strafford, 1593-1641, A Revaluation. 
74. (London: Phoenix Press, 1961), 74. Wedgewood gives her source as Bodleian Library, Tanner 
MSS, LXXII, fol. 300-3. 
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